Operation Beaver Cage Command Chronology

From the Vietnam War Period of April 1, 1967 Through May 13, 1967

Posted on Oct 18, 2018 (last modified Apr 30, 2023)

This document is a declassified record of the Vietnam War from the period of Apr 1, 1967 to May 13, 1967, which generally pertains to the operation known as "Beaver Cage". The document was transcribed from a PDF file for the purpose of making it more useful for research (i.e. more legible, hyperlinked, and searchable). In some places, the scanned source document was somewhat illegible. The following symbology is used to reflect what was questionable during the transcription:

  • [?] = One character exists here that is completely illegible or highly questionable.
  • [X?] = Character here looks like character in brackets, but is questionable to some degree.
  • [O or 0] = May be first of second character within brackets.
  • […] = Several characters or words of unrecognizable text.

Source:
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY [BLT 1/3], 01 April 1967, Box __, Folder 039, US Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1201039031, Accessed 22 Oct 2019.

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 1/3
Regimental Landing Team-26
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, F[?]F
FPO, San Francisco 96602

1/swd
5750
SerNo: 007-67
31 May 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Command Task Group 79.4

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 April 1967 through 13 May 1967

Ref:

  1. MCO 5750.2A
  2. Brig[O or 0] 5750.1A
  3. FMFPACO 5750.8

Encl: (1) Battalion Landing Team 1/3 Command Chronology

  1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) through (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.
  2. Downgrade at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years.

P.A. Wickwire signature
P. A. WICKWIRE

INDEX

PART I – ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

DesignationCommander
Battalion Landing Team 1/3 […]LtCol P. A. WICKWIRE

Subordinate Units

DesignationCommander
H&S CompanyCapt J. H. MACK
Company ACapt P. N. HENDRIX
(1 Apr – 6 May 67)
Capt C. G. JORDAN
(7 May – 13 May 67)
Company BCapt J. C. SHIRLEY
Company CCapt G. F. RECZEK
Company DCapt E. P. ALDOUS Jr.

(Attached Units)

DesignationCommander
Det HqCo, 9thMAB (Radio Relay)Cpl J. N. MAGGI
Det 15th Med BnLt D. M. MC GINN
Det Postal Section Hq Bn 3dMarDivSgt W. A. LEDFORD
Det Photo Section Hq Bn 3dMarDivCpl G. F. ORSZAG
Det Disbursing Section Hq Bn 3dMarDivCapt C. B. YELLIG
Det Hq Bn RLT-26 (Radio Relay)Cpl K. K. FROST
Btry A (Rein), 1stBn, 12thMarCapt D. J. HARRINGTON
107mm MtrBtry, 2dBn, 12thMarCapt A. M. PATTERSON
1stPlt (Rein), CoB 1stAmTracBn1stLt S. J. BROWN
1stPlt (Rein), CoA 3dATBn2dLt W. M. HAYES
3dPlt (Rein), CoC 3dTankBn2dLt L. D. DOBBIN
2dPlt (Rein), CoA 3dEngrBn2dLt F. G. WENTWORTH
1stPlt, Co[B?] 3dReconBn2dLt R. H. FREEMAN
1st Clearing Plt (Rein), CoB 3dMedBnLt R. G. SCHEIBE, USN
Det 3dServBn (Provided by FLC)Lt. F. J. HAUGH
2dPlt (Rein), CoB 3dSPBn2dLt K. A. WYMER
1stPlt (Rein), CoB 3dMTBn2dLt. D. M. BYSTEDT

Location

  1. 1-4 Apr 1967 – Camp Schwab, Okinawa
  2. 5-19 Apr 1967 – Afloat with CTG 79.4
  3. 20-23 Apr 1967 – SLF Camp, Subic Bay Philippines
  4. 24-27 Apr 1967 – Afloat with CTG 79.4
  5. 28 Apr- 18 May 1967 – Operation Beaver Cage, RVN
  6. 3 May 1967 – Afloat with CTG 79.4 3.

Staff Officers

Executive OfficerMaj B. D. THORNBURY
S-12dLt E. W. STERLING
S-2CWO P. B. MURPHY
S-3Maj R. C. OSSENFORT
S-4Capt C. G. JORDON (1 Apr – 6 May 67) Capt P. N. HENDRIX (7 – 13 May 67)

Average Monthly Strength

USMC OfficersEnlistedUSN OfficersEnlistedOther
601660890None

PART II – NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During this reporting period Battalion Landing Team 1/3 conducted Special Operations in the Republic of Vietnam and training therefore.

The first part of the reporting period was spent training for Spec Ops. A LEX was held on Okinawa with conditions and circumstances approximating those of RVN as closely as possible. The LEX was aborted one day early because of inclement weather; and an advanced party to the SLF Camp at NB Subic Bay was detached, and the BLT backloaded and set sail on board the ships of TG 76.4.

AKA 104, USS Seminole, received three days of upkeep at Kaohsiung, Taiwan.

Then orders were received, the advance party was withdrawn from NB Subic and TG 79.4 sailed for the territorial waters off RVN. Two days later new orders were received, and the BLT sailed for and off loaded at the SLF Cam NM Subic. After three days training at Subic Bay, new orders were again received and the BLT returned to the territorial waters off RVN.

On 28 April 1967 the BLT commenced Operation Beaver Cage. The first four days were in support of Operation Union. "D" Company operated on the beach in the vicinity of BT 305361 while "A", "B", and "C" Companies and the BLT command element operated inland, approximately 27 miles SSE of Da Nang AB. During this time only light enemy contact was made, however the BLT suffered heat casualties and more than 100 personnel were medevaced during this period.

After four days, the BLT shifted 5 miles north and set up Headquarters in vicinity of BT 128388, at Landing Zone Cardinal. Companies were assigned individual TAOR’s and enemy contact began to increase in size and frequency.

On 2 May, both "A" and "C" Companies made contact with enemy units of platoon size, or greater.

On 4 May "D" Company, while crossing a valley East of Hill 65, BT 094392 encountered intensive enemy resistance and had elements pinned down. Air and artillery support were called, and "C" Company was moved to Hill 65 to be in a position to support. Air and artillery continued into the night and "D" Company elements in contact with the enemy withdrew to Hill 65 under cover of darkness.

On 5 May "B", "C", and "D" Companies conducted extensive search and destroy operations in the valley, coordinates BT 0904 west to BT 2041. That evening local Viet Cong attacked BLT supporting elements in the process of extracting from Landing Zone Cardinal. Landing Zone Cardinal came under enemy mortar and small arms fire. H&S Compand and W/2/12 personnel in the zone reacted and supporting arms assistance was requested. Two hundred men and 3000 pounds of ammunition were evacuated in one and one half hours of gathering darkness under constant enemy fire without any friendly casualties. Enemy casualties were 10 VC KIA confirmed and 20 VC KIA probable.

The command elements with “A” Company in reserve moved to Que Son, and "B", "C", and "D" Companies commenced to sweep the valley west of Hill 65 in the vicinity of BT 060390. As the Companies swept the valley to the West, enemy mortar attacks became frequent and small arms resistance was encountered. After four days the companies reached the upper end of the valley and turned and began to sweep back down the valley to the East.

On 10 May "B" and "C" Companies, leading the sweep in the vicinity of BT 030390, met small arms resistance. Both companies were unable to either advance or break contact. Supporting arms were called in, but were hampered by the closeness of contact. Additional help was requested and "C" Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines moved down the southern ridgeline and into the valley at BT 046384 to cut off enemy units moving either into or out of the battle area. "D" Company split its personnel, sending two platoons to "B" Company and one platoon to "C" Company. Forty personnel of Sparrow Hawk Platoon were inserted, however the platoon met such resistance that further use of helicopters in the area became impractical. Supporting arms continued to strike at enemy contact whenever possible. By evening the backbone of the enemy attack had been broken, contact had lessened and resupply and medevac helicopters were able to reach the friendly units. May 10th, the most active day of Operation Beaver Cage had cost BLT 1/3 22KIA and 88 WIA, and the enemy 181 KIA (confirmed), 136 KIA (probable), and 66 VC prisoners and detainees.

During the next two days "B", "C" and "D" Companies continued sweeping the Valley to the west. On 12 May they arrived at helicopter Landing Zone Quail in the vicinity of BT 060395 which had been secured by elements of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. On this day all elements of BLT 1/3 were extracted from this zone or from Landing Zone Magpie at Que Son, to the ships of TG 76.4. After 15 days, Operation Beaver Cage was completed.

PART III – SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Sequence of Events:

3 April

BLT 1/3 boarded the ships of TG 76.4

5 April

Rehearsal for Landing Exercise conducted aboard ships

6 April

BLT 1/3 commenced a Landing Exercise in the vicinity of Kin Village, Okinawa

7 April

BrigGen METZGER visited BLT 1/3. Landing Exercise completed. BLT 1/3 backloaded on board the ships of TG 76.4

17 April

BLT 1/3 arrived in the territorial waters of the Republic of Vietnam

19 April

BLT 1/3 left the territorial waters of the Republic of Vietnam for NB Subic Bay

20 April

BLT 1/3 off loaded at the SLF Camp, NB Subic Bay

23 April

BLT 1/3 backloaded on board the ships of TG 76.4

25 April

BLT 1/3 arrived in the territorial waters off the Republic of Vietnam and prepared for forthcoming Amphibious Operations

28 April

Operation Beaver Cage commenced in support of Operation Union at 0700 with the landing of "C" Company at BT 186294, followed by “A” Company at BT 19[8?]265 by helicopter. "D" Company, with attached tanks and ontos commenced amphibious landing at BT 305361 by LVT at 0800. A/1/12 landed at Hill 29 while W/2/12 and the BLT Command Group Landed at BT 186294. Search and destroy operations were conducted in each company’s TAOR with light resistance encountered. No friendly casualties were sustained while 5 VCS were captured.

29 April

Search and destroy operations were conducted throughout the day while "[B?]" and "C" Companies proceeded to BT 165277 to establish a new C.P. “A” Company was helilifted to BT 149234. Landing Zones in the new TAOR were secured and W/2/12 and the BLT Command Group were helilifted to the new C.P. Light resistance in the form of sniper fire was encountered with 2 VC KIA, 2 VC WIA and 9 VCS captured. No friendly casualties were sustained.

30 April

Local search and destroy operations were conducted with light resistance encountered. Mortars were used against various targets with unknown results. Tanks and Onto’s were backloaded aboard ship by LVT while "B" Company helilifted to BT 128388 and "D" Company helilifted to 132399. One VC was wounded and captured, one killed, five probable VC KIA and one U. S. WIA was sustained.

1 May

Local search and destroy operations conducted by all companies. “A” Company spotted 75 – 100 VC near BT 169240. An artillery mission on […] excellent target coverage but unknown results. Groups of [?]0 – [3?]0 VC were engaged by "B" and "D" Companies in fire fights and mortar attacks with unknown results. In late afternoon “A” Company, W/2/12 and the BLT Command Group were helilifted to BT 128388 while "C" Company was helilifted to BT 132399. One VCS was captured, [one?] VC killed and one wounded.

2 May

Extensive search and destroy operations conducted by all companies with light contact with small groups of VC throughout the day. At 1930 "C" Company, digging in at BT 098385, came under heavy 82mm mortar, [?]7mm recoiless rifle, automatic weapons and small arms fire. 105mm and 107mm artillery fire was called in on targets at BT 166384 and BT 110374. Ancestor Flareship, Spooky Gunship, Huey Gunshis and fixed wing airstrikes called in on the same targets. The heavy fire and the advance of the VC units were effectively stopped. 4 U.S. KIA, 14 WIA and 6 WIANE were sustained during the battle while 2 VC KIA were confirmed. A thorough follow up search of the area was not conducted due to operational commitments assigned by higher headquarters.

3 May

Medevac and emergency resupply of "C" Company conducted at first light. Sparrow Hawk force inserted at BT 120384 to extract Reconnaissance element and attack area of possible VC mortars. Search and destroy operations were continued by all companies with little contact. At 1[?]30 an “A” Company water patrol made contact at BT 094356 and received heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire. Artillery and HUIE Gunships were utilized to suppress the fire and four squads were sent to assist the water patrol. This action lasted into the late evening hours with the situation remaining unclear until the following day.

4 May

Search and destroy mission of TAOR continued by all companies. "A" Company’s casualties from the previous night were med-evaced. The final count showed 14 KIA, [8?] WIA and 1 WIANE. Enemy casualties were [3? or 8?] KIA confirmed and 6 KIA probable. "A" Company called in artillery mission on 60 to 70 VC at BT 096404 and BT 095405. Mortar and small arms fire was received during scattered fire fights. "D" Company reported extensive tunnel complexes throughout their operating area. Total casualties for the day included 11 U.S. KIA, 20 WIA, 6 WIANE. Enemy casualties were unknown.

5 May

"B" Company helolifted to BT 094392 to link up with "C" and "D" Companies to conduct a search and destroy sweep of the area. Helolift of A/1/12. W/2/12 and Brave Command Group to BT 031341 began at 1500. At 1815 the LZ at BT 1283[8?][8?] came under heavy attack by 82mm mortars., automatic rifle and small arms fire. Klondike Gunships directed airstrikes by F-9’s and a Spooky Gunship to suppress the fire and used it’s rockets and machine guns to destroy the mortar. Results were 10 VC KIA confirmed, 20 VC KIA probable with no U. S. casualties.

6 May

Search and destroy operations encountered light resistance in the form of sporadic sniper fire throughout the day. The positions of the companies at the end of the day were – "B" Company – BT 072395; "C" Company – BT 06239[?]; "D" Company – BT 057395. 4 U. S. WIA were sustained during the period with 3 probable VC KIA.

7 May

Search and destroy operations continued with light resistance. The companies set up night defensive positions as follows: "[B?]" Company – BT 021383; "C" Company – BT 023399; "D" Company BT 03038[5?]. After setting in for the night "C" and "D" Companies received approximately 12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. One U. S. KAI, six U. S. WIA sustained in the attack. An artillery mission was fired on a reported VC Battalion at BT 055371 which resulted in a secondary explosion.

8 May

Search and destroy sweep by "B", "C", and "D" Companies continued with moderate resistance from small arms and sporadic mortar attacks. 6 VCS were captured and 5 VC KIA confirmed were counted. U. S. casualties were 3 KIA and 10 WIA. Airstrikes by Klondike and fixed wing aircraft destroyed one mortar.

9 May

Search and destroy sweep continued to the west. Companies encountered sporadic small arms and mortar fire. Klondike Gunships, fixed wing air strikes and small arms fire were used to neutralize enemy fire. 7 VCS were captured and 1 VC KIA confirmed.

10 May

The direction of the search and destroy sweep was reversed and proceeded to the east from the north-south line through BT 0[2?]41. "B", "C", and "D" Companies came under intensive attack by mortar, automatic and small arms fire from hill 110 to the south, from the slopes to the north and trenchlines to the east. Four air strikes by fixed wing aircraft and five by Klondike Gunships against various VC emplacements, along with coordinated attacks by the Companies effectively silenced enemy opposition. U. S. casualties were 22 KIA and 8[8?] WIA. Enemy casualties were 181 (KIA confirmed), 136 KIA (probable), and 66 VC prisoners and detainees.

11 May

Movement of "B", "C", and "D" Companies to LZ until at […] 060377 for backloading to ships of AR[G?] 76.4 continued throughout the day with no enemy contact.

12 May

Backload of all BLT units completed by 1900, and Operation Beaver Cage ended.

13 May

Preparation of personnel and equipment for future operations commenced.

Personnel

  1. Replacements: no replacements were received
  2. Casualties: 55 KIA, 151 WIAE, 50 WIANE, 5 deaths due to loss of helicopter in transferring personnel between ships.
  3. Awards: 8 Purple Hearts
  4. Postal, promotions and personnel accounting remain satisfactory.

Administration

Company administration is functioning smoothly under the supervision of Company Commander and Company First Sergeants.

Command Relations

Battalion Landing Team 1/3 is OPCON to CTG 79.4 and ADCO[N or H] to CG, 9thMAB.

Intelligence

Initial enemy contact on Operation Beaver Cage consisted of harassing/sniper fire with two mortar attacks. Search and Destroy operations uncovered numerous caches of rice and extensive tunnel complexes.

Intelligence reports revealed the possible movement of an unidentified battalion into the vicinity of BT 055370 on 7 May; three artillery missions were fired resulting in two secondary explosions. Significant enemy contact for the period was made with major elements of the 105th MF Battalion in the vicinity of BT 033385. Enemy losses for this engagement were sizeable; 40 VC/NVA KIA confirmed and 70 KIA probable. Major items of captured equipment were 2 – 60mm mortar sights, one 7.62 heavy machine gun, 2 SKS semiautomatic rifles, and one 7.62 AK-47 assault rifle. Of this gear, one mortar sight and the heavy machine gun were destroyed. Captured material consisted of 2 NVA diaries, 3 wallets containing NVA pictures, and anti-American literature, 1 VC/NVA medical bag. Numerous small arms ammunition, mortars and grenades were destroyed.

Close Air Support

During the period at sea only minimal air support was needed and air operations were limited to helicopter sorties of an administrative and logistical nature.

The tactical nature of both operations dictated extensive use of air support.

During Operation Beaver Cage (28 April – 12 May) helicopter support was provided by our brother unit in the S.L.F., H[?][?]-263, which flew 44[2?]9 UH-34 sorties and 389 UH-1E Gunship and TACA sorties; and 1stMAW helicopter squadrons which flew occasional medevacs. Fixed wind support was provided by elements of the 1stMAW and 7th Air Force who flew 21 01E observation, spotting, and TACA sorties; 30 fixed wind strike sorties; 4 C-47 gunship sorties; and 1 C-130 flareship sortie in support.

Logistics

  1. Supply. During this period, approximately 101 requisitions were placed through FSR with only 3[5?] completed. For Operation Beaver Cage […]ndable supplies were furnished from LSA Tam Ky, RVN.
  2. Maintenance. During this period limited 3rd echelon maintenance was provided for engineer and communications equipment by an attached LSU detachment from 3d Service Battalion under shipboard and combat conditions.
  3. Transportation. On 3 April transportation to assigned shipping was provided at Camp Schwab, Okinawa by RLT-26. From 20 to 23 April at SLF Camb Subic Bay, transportation was provided by U. S. Naval Station, Subic Bay.
  4. Fiscal. Project 24 funds expended during this period amounted to $20,162.00.
  5. Embarkation. BLT 1/3 embarked for Okinawa aboard USS Okinawa LPH-3, USS Bayfield APA-33, USS Point Defiance LSD-31 and USS Seminole AKA-104. On 20 April personnel from assigned shipping were debarked to SLF Camp, Subic Bay and on 23 April were reembarked aboard assigned shipping. On 28 April personnel and equipment of BLT 1/3 were disembarked RVN to participate in Operation Beaver Cage and reembarked on 12 May.

PART IV – SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

  1. BLT 1/3 Operation Order 5-67 (Added s[?]c 308 033)
  2. BLT 1/3 Administrative Plan 5-67
  3. BLT 1/3 Frag Order No 1 to OpOrder 5-67 (Added)
  4. BLT 1/3 After Action Report Operation Beaver Cage

FRAG ORDER NUMBER 1 TO OPERATION 5-67

Ref:

  1. CTG 79.4 Op Plan 120A-67
  2. CTG 79.4 Frag Order Number 1 to Op Plan 120A-67
  3. BLT 1/3 Op Order 5-67
  4. Operations Overlay ALFA (Enclosure (1) to BLT 1/3 Frag Order Number 1 to Operation Order 5-67).
  5. Operations Overlay BRAVO (Enclosure (2) to BLT 1/3 Frag Order Number 1 to Operation Order 5-67).
  6. Intelligence Estimate for Operation Beaver Cage (Enclosure (3) to BLT 1/3 Frag Order Number 1 to Operation Order 5-67).
  7. Maps: Viet Nam AMS Series L7014, Sheets 664oI, II, III, and IV.

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION

BLT 1/3 LtCol WICKWIRE
H&SCo (-)(Rein) Lt Mack
H&SCo (-)
Det. (-) HqBn 3rdMarDivCapt YELLIG
Det. Disbursing Section
Det. Postal Section
Det. 9thMAB (Radio Relay)
Det. HqCo 26thMar (Radio Relay)
Det. Btry A 1stBn 12thMar (LnTm)Lt PHILLIPS
Det. HqBtry 1stBtn 12thMar (NGF LnTm)Ens MCCORMICK (USN)
1st Clearing Flat(Rein) Co B 3dMedBnLt SCHEIBE (USN)
Logistical Support UnitLt HAUCH
Det. 3rd ServBn
Sqd. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn
Sec. AirDelPlat H&SCo ProvServBn 9thMAB
1stPlat Co B 3rdReconBnLt FREEMAN
Det. 15th Dental CoLt MCGINN (USN)
Beach Jumper Unit # 1Ltjg CAMPBELL (USN)
Co A (Rein)Capt HENDRIX
Co A
Det. HqBtry 1stBn 12thMar (NGF SpotTm)
FO TM Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rdSPBn (HST)
Det. H&SCo
1stSec 81mm Mort Plat
Det. Intel Sec
Det Med Plat
Det. Comm Plat
Det. TACP
Co C (Rein)Capt Re[…]K
Co C
FO TM Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rd SPBn (HST)
Det. H&SCo
3rd Sec 81mm Mort Plat
Det. Intel Sec.
Det. Med Plat
Det.Comm Plat
Det. TACP (FACTm)
Det. HqBn 3rdMarDiv (Photo Se[c?])
Co D (Rein)Lt ALDOUS
Co D
FO TM Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
Det, 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rdEngrBn
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rdSPBn (HST)
Det. HqBtry 1stBn 12thMar (NGF SpotTm)
Det. H&SCo
4th Sec 81mm Mort Plat
Det. Intel Sec
Det. Med Plat
Det. Comm Plat
Det. TACP
Sqd. MP Plat MPCo HqCo 9thMAB
4th Plat(Rein) Co A 5thAmTracBnLt BROWN
1st Plat(Rein) Co A 3rdATBnLt HAYES
3rd Plat(Rein) Co C 3rdTkBnLt DOBBINS
Btry A (-)(Rein) 1stBn 12th MarinesCapt HARRINGTON
Btry A
Det. HqBtry 1stBn 12thMar
107mm Mortar Btry 2ndBn 12th Marines Capt PATTERSON
2nd Plat (-)(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBnLt WENTWORTH
2ndPlat Co A 3rd EngrBn
Det. H&SCo 3rd EngrBn
Det. Engr SuptCo 3rdEngrBn
1stPlat (Rein) Co B 3rdMTBn Lt BYSTEDT
1stPlat Co B 3rdMTBn
Det.H&SCo 3rdMTBn
2ndPlat (-)(Rein) Co B 3rdSPBn Lt WYMER
2dPlat Co B 3rdSPBn
Det. H&SCo 3rdSPBn
*Det. BMU, NBG
BLT RESERVECapt SHIRLEY
Co B
FO TM Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rdEngrBn
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rdSPBn (HST)
Det. H&SCo
2nd Sec 81mm Mort Plat
Det. Intel Sec
Det. Med Plat
Det. Comm Plat
Det. TACP

* Provided from Navy sources. Becomes a part of the Task Organization when the Shore Party Team is activated.

  1. SITUATION
    1. Enemy Forces.
      1. (1) Current Insums.
      2. (2) Reference (f).
    2. Friendly Forces.
      1. See reference (f).
    3. Attachments and Detachments.
      1. Task Organization.
  2. MISSION. BLT 1/3 conducts an amphibious assault commencing […] Hour, D-Day in Thang Binh and Tam Ky Districts, Quang Tin […] destroy enemy forces by:
    1. Ph1: Seizing a designated beach area and approaches […] designated helicopter landing zones and surrounding […].
    2. Ph2: Coordinating search and destroy operations simultaneously within the designated TAOR (and the additional […] the AOA).
    3. Ph3: Conducting amphibious withdrawal on order.
  3. EXECUTION.
    1. Concept of Operations. Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day […] company will land over Red Beach, seizing and securing […] approaches thereto and conducting search and destroy operations in designated TAOR. At L-Hour on D-Day, two […] conduct helicopter assaults into LZ Thrush and […] surrounding terrain and on order conduct search and destroy operations in assigned ZOA. One rifle company will be […] SLF Reserve aboard LPH to include Sparrow Hawk Force […] to control of BLT 1/3. On order the BLT will conduct amphibious withdrawal.
    2. Company "C" (Rein).
      1. (1) Commencing at L-Hour, D-Day, conduct a helicopterborne assault to seize Landing Zone Oriole.
      2. (2) On order conduct search and destroy operations in designated ZOA. Seize BLT Objectives 2,62,4,6,8 and 1[0?].
      3. (3) Be prepared to conduct amphibious withdrawal on order.
    3. Company “A” (Rein).
      1. (1) Commencing on order on D-Day, conduct a helicopterborne assault to seize Landing Zone Thrush.
      2. (2) On order conduct search and destroy operations in designated ZOA. Seize BLT Objectives 1,3,61,5,7, and 9.
      3. (3) Be prepared to conduct amphibious withdrawal on order.
    4. Company "D" (Rein).
      1. (1) Commencing ay H-Hour on D-Day conduct a waterborne assault by LVT’s over Red Beach.
      2. (2) Seize BLT Objective 11.
      3. (3) On order commence search and destroy operations in North one-half of designated TAOR. Seize BLT Objective 12.
      4. (4) On order continue search and destroy operations in South one-half of designated TAOR. Seize BLT Objective 13.
      5. (5) Be prepared to execute helicopterborne linkup with BLT on order.
    5. Battery “A” (-)(Rein) 1st Bn. 12th Marines.
      1. (1) on order commence helicopterborne movement to vicinity 5th MArines Command Post. (Hill 35)
      2. (2) Establish position and provide direct support fires in support of assault elements of BLT 1/3.
      3. (3) Priority of fires to helicopter assault forces.
      4. (4) Be prepared to displace and/or conduct amphibious withdrawal on order.
    6. 107mm Mortar Battery, 2nd Bn, 12th Marines.
      1. (1) On order conduct helicopterborne movement to designated landing zone. Provide direct support fires in support of assault elements of BLT 1/3.
      2. (2) Prioroty of fires to helicopterborne [… probably “assualt forces”].
      3. (3) Be prepared to displace and/or conduct amphibious withdrawal on order
    7. 2nd Platoon (-)(Rein) Company “A”, 3d Engr Bn.
      1. (1) General Support.
      2. (2) On order land over Blue Beach, provide engineer support for Company "D".
    8. BLT Reserve. Company "B" (Rein)
      1. (1) Provide one platoon (Rein) for Sparrow Hawk Reaction force while aboard LPH, in accordance with Annex N of reference (c).
      2. (2) Upon release of Sparrow Hawk requirements by SLF Commander, be prepared to be helilifted ashore to function under direct control of BLT 1/3 Commander.
      3. (3) On order land by helicopterborne means in designated landing zone/objective.
      4. (4) Be prepared to assume the mission of assault companies in assigned TAOR’s.
      5. (5) Be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations as directed.
    9. 106mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon.
      1. (1) General Support.
      2. (2) On order land in designated landing zone/objective area.
      3. (3) Be prepared to provide anti-personnel support fires in designated ZOA.
    10. Coordinating Instructions.
      1. (1) Notify CLF of BLT Reaction Force location and readiness posture on continuing basis.
      2. (2) Establish and maintain liaison with 2nd ARVN Div and 6th Regiment, 2nd ARVN Div as of 1600, D-1.
      3. (3) Operation Overlay (issued separately).
      4. (4) RCA authorized for tactical operations within AOA. Won-wind hazard to friendly troops and non-combatants outside the target areas will be minimized consistent with tactical requirements.
      5. (5) D-Day – 28 April 1967 (to be announced).
      6. (6) L-Hour – 0700, H-Hour 0800.
      7. (7) AOA for operation is the land area contained within a ten nautical mile arc centered on Grid Coordinates 299379, AMS Series L7014, Sheet 6640I. The seaward extension of the AOA is contained in a 25 nautical mile arc drawn from the same coordinate. Both arcs are terminated and joined by the shoreline. Air space above the land and sea AOA from 0 – 25,000 feet mean sea level and tunnels for the passage of civil air traffic will be promulgated by NOTAM as directed by COMUSMAVC.
      8. (8) Fire support coordination IAW reference (c) and as modified below:
      9. (9) Code name of Operation is “BEAVER CAGE”
      10. (10) Landing Plan IAW Annex F of reference (c).
      11. (11) Centered Red Beach Coordinates 299379.
      12. (12) Centered LZ Coordinates are:
        1. Oriole – 186294
        2. Canary – 206259
        3. Parakeet – 195293
        4. Thrush – 198265
        5. Owl – 190284
      13. (13) Reference Points. (Use as thrust points).
        1. (a) Girls – BT 2741
        2. (b) Ships – BT 2028
        3. (c) Cigarettes – BT 2938
        4. (d) Months – BT 1926
        5. (e) Boys – BT 1727
      14. (14) Helo Landing Diagram to be issued by SLF ALPHA.
      15. (15) Amphibious withdrawal code name “Water Lily”.
      16. (16) Each Company be prepared to provide one reinforce platoon as Sparrow Hawk Force on order.
      17. (17) Marines with Vietnamese language ability will be used appropriately.
      18. (18) Heliborne assault companies should be prepared to attack or defend NE if required.
      19. (19) Company "B" and “W” Battery should be prepared for Heli-lift into any primary or alternate LZ available.
      20. (20) Company "D" will notify the BLT Commander prior to landing of all desired on-call waves.
      21. (21) All assault companies will be completely familiar with all primary and alternate LZ’s.
      22. (22) Any H&I fires within 500 meters of battalion boundaries must be cleared by the 5th Marine Regiment.
      23. (23) NGF will be in direct support of Company "D".
      24. (24) This order is effective for planning upon receipt and for execution upon order.
  4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
    1. Supply.
      1. (1) General - - - Redesignate Administration Plan 5-67 as as Administrative Order 5-67.
      2. (2) Supply sources - - - All classes of supplies ashore will be drawn from LSA.
      3. (3) Distribution - - - Distribution of supplies will be direct from LSA to using unit.
      4. (4) Resupply
        1. (a) Shore Party will furnish a liaison team of at least 10 men to LSA at Tam Ky. Guard TacLog Net.
        2. (b) Resupply of all classes will be requested through BLT-S-4 and relayed through LSA.
    2. Service.
      1. (1) Maintenance and logistic support will be provided by LSA ashore.
    3. Miscellaneous.
      1. (1) Uniform and equipmment.
        1. (a) Field jackets win not be carried ashoro.
        2. (b) Light Marching Pack w/E-tool vice Marching Pack.
  5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS.
    1. Communications - Electronics.
      1. (1) Annex I to rererence (c).
      2. (2) Current COI.
      3. (3) Visual Communications Plan (issued separately)
    2. Command Posts.
      1. (1) The SLF Command Post will be located aboard the USS Okinawa (LPH-3).
      2. (2) BLT CP will be located vicinity Hill 29 (coordinates 226322).
      3. (3) Company and Battery commanders report CP locations ashore when established.

P.A. Wickwire signature
P. A. WICKWIRE
Lieutenant Colonel U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 3d Marines
FPO, San Francisco 96602

6/djz
5050
17 May 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander Task Group 79.4

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation Beaver Cage)

Encl:

  1. Map Sheet 6640 II
  2. Map Sheet 6640 II
  3. Map Sheet 6640 II
  4. Map Sheet 6640 II
  5. Map Sheet 6640 II and 6640 III
  6. Map Sheet 6640 II and 6640 III
  7. Map Sheet 6640 II and 6640 III

Name of Operation

Beaver Cage, Search and Destroy Operation.

Inclusive Dates and Location of Operation

28 Apr - 12 May 1967. QuanQuc Son and Quang Thang Bin Provinces RVN.

Command Headquarters

CTG 79.4

TASK ORGANIZATION

BLT 1/3 LtCol WICKWIRE
  H&SCo (-)(ReinF) Lt Mack
  Det. (-) HqBn 3rdMarDiv
    Det. Disbursing SectionCapt YELLIG
    Det. Postal Section
  Det. 9thMAB (Radio Relay)
  Det. HqCo 26thMar (Radio Relay)
  Det. Btry A 1stBn 12thMar (LnTm)Lt PHILLIPS
  Det. HqBtry 1stBtn 12thMar (NGF LnTm)Ens MCCORMICK (USN)
  1st Clearing Flat(Rein) Co B 3dMedBnLt SCHEIBE (USN)
  Logistical Support UnitLt HAUCH
     Det. 3rd ServBn
  Sqd. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn
  1stPlat Co B 3rdReconBnLt FREEMAN
  Det. 15th Dental CoLt MCGINN (USN)
  Beach Jumper Unit # 1Ltjg CAMPBELL (USN)
   Co A (Rein)[?]
    Co A
    Det. HqBtry 1stBn 12thMar (NGF SpotTm)Capt JORDAN 6May-12May
    FO TM Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
    Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn
    Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rdSPBn (HST)
    Det. H&SCo
      1stSec 81mm Mort Plat
      Det. Intel Sec
      Det. MedPlat
      Det. CommPlat
      Det. TACP
   Co B (ReinF)
    Co BCapt SHIRLEY
    FO TM Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
    Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rdEngrBn
    Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rdSPBn (HST)
    Det. H&SCo
      2nd Sec 81mm Mort Plat
      Det. Intel Sec
      Det. Med Plat
      Det. Comm Plat
      Det. TACP
   Co C (ReinF)
    Co CCapt RECZEK
    FO TM Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
    Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn
    Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rd SPBn (HST)
    Det. H&SCo
      3rd Sec 81mm Mort Plat
      Det. Intel Sec.
      Det.Comm Plat
      Det. TACP (FACTm)
    Det. HqBn 3rdMarDiv (Photo Sec)
   Co D (ReinF)
    Co DLt ALDOUS
    FO TM Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
    Det. 2ndPlat (Rein) Co A 3rdEngrBn
    Det. 2ndPlat (Rein) Co B 3rdSPBn (HST)
    Det. HqBtry 1stBn 12thMar (NGF SpotTm)
    Det. H&SCo
      4th Sec 81mm Mort Plat
      Det. Intel Sec
      Det. Med Plat
      Det. Comm Plat
      Det. TACP
    Sqd. MP Plat MPCo HqCo 9thMAB
    ** 4th Plat(ReinF) Co A 5thAmTracBnLt BROWN
    ** 1st Plat(ReinF) Co A 3rdATBnLt HAYES
    ** 3rd Plat(ReinF) Co C 3rdTkBnLt DOBBINS
   Btry A (-)(ReinF) 1stBn 12th MarinesCapt HARRINGTON
    Btry A
    Det. HqBtry 1stBn 12thMar
   107mm Mortar Btry 2ndBn 12th Marines Capt PATTERSON
   2nd Plat (-)(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBnLt WENTWORTH
    2ndPlat Co A 3rd EngrBn
    Det. H&SCo 3rd EngrBn
    Det. Engr SuptCo 3rdEngrBn
   1stPlat (Rein) Co B 3rdMTBn Lt BYSTEDT
    1stPlat Co B 3rdMTBn
    Det.H&SCo 3rdMTBn
   2ndPlat (-)(Rein) Co B 3rdSPBn Lt WYMER
    2dPlat Co B 3rdSPBn
    Det. H&SCo 3rdSPBn
    *Det.BMU, NBG

* Provided from Navy Sources. Became a part of the Task organization when the Shore Party Team was activated.

** Back loaded aboard the USS Pt. Defiance on April 1967.

Intelligence

  1. Information received fram higher echelon concerning the enemy's strength, location, disposition, situation, tactics, capabilities and terrain prior to the operation was adequate, however, contact was not made with any unit reported in the area of operations. Significant contact was made with elements of the 105th MF Battalion reported by the Que Son distriot chief and confirmed by ITT personnel.
  2. The first four days of the operation; the enemy contact consisted of sniper and harassing fire in the vicinity of Landing Zone Oriole and Thrush and objectives 11, 12, and 13 on Red Beach. Numerous tunnels and spider traps were uncovered and destroyed in the vacinity of Red Beach (BT 3037). An estimated [...] of rice was discovered in the vicinity of LZ Oriole and Thrush, rice was picked up and redistributed by Popular Forces.
  3. Search and Destroy operations in the vicinity of Landing Zone Cardinal were more active than those reported for Landing Zone Oriole and Thrush. An estimated VC/NVA company was observed in the vicinity of BT 1237 on 1 May. Interrogation of VCS revealed extensive tunnels complexes in the village of Phu Thai (BT 0940) many tunnels were uncovered in that vicinity. Estimated VC/NVA strength in the vicinity of Phu Thai was one company. Interrogation of VCS also revealed (not yet confirmed) that the village of Phu Thai was the location of a VC dispensary staffed by two VC/NVA corpsman and two female nurses and a 1500 meter tunnel that runs from the oenter of the village to the mouatains NW (approx coord BT 087414), Overall estimate of enemy strength in the vicinity of LZ Cardinal was reported to be two VC battalions observed by CAS and armed Huey aircraft the night of 5 May.
  4. The valley which runs east to west from a MSR (BT 0739 to 0139) contained the 105th VC/NVA MF Battalion. Initial contact consisted of harassing and sniper fire with two mortar attacks. The Que Son district chief reported elements of the 105th MF Battalion were operating in the valley, (later confirmed by ITT personnel). District chief reported that a possible 300 man force was moving to the vicinity of Hill 123, (BT 055370) on 7 May, three artillery missions were fired with two secondary explosions observed., later reports from district chief was the distruction of two large ammunition caches and no further reports of the estimated battalion. Significant enemy contact was made with an rein-forced MF VC company (possible two companies) in the vicinity of Hill 110 (BT 033385). Enemy losses for this engagement were sizable 40 VC/NCA KIA by body count and 70 KIA Probable. Major items of equipment captured were two 60mm mortar sights, two SKS Soviet 7.62mm Semiautomatic Carbines, one AK-47 7.62 Assault Rifle, one 7.62 Heavy Machine Gun SG 43' & S.GM and one wooden mock up rifle. Captured Material: 2 NVA diaries, 3 wallets containing pictures of NVA soldiers and anti Amerioan literature, 1 VC/NVA medical bag, I medical handbook, Equipment Destroyed: 25 rounds of 60mm mortar, 25 CHICOM Grenades, 500 rounds of small arms ammunition, punji traps and sticks and an assortment of VC/NVA 782 Equipment.
  5. The temperature during the operation was hot and humid with temperatures well over 100 degrees during the day and approximately 75 degrees at night with only one day of rain. Pay War leaflets were dropped in the operational area without much success due to rapid movement.

Mission

  1. Phase I. Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day, land by waterborne assault over Red Beach, and seize and secure the beach and approaches thereto. Commencing at L-Hour on D-Day, land by helicopterborne assault into LZ's Oriole and Thrush, and seize the LZ's and surropunding terrain.
  2. Phase II. On order conduct search and destroy operations within the designated TAOR and the additional zone of action within the AOA. Establish reserve rifle company aboard the LPH prepared to land by helicopter to be committed only with the permission of CLF. Within the reserve establish a platoon size Sparrow Hawk Force. If the reserve is committed, constitute and maintain a Sparrow Hawk Force as required by the tactical situation ashore. Establish and maintain liaison with adjacent and supporting units as required.
  3. Phase III. On order, conduct an amphibious withdrawal.

Execution

Colors Legend:
Alpha Co. Bravo Co. Charlie Co. Delta Co. Multiple companies or not company-specific.

You can see the following sequence of events on Google Earth Web.

  1. L-Hour was designated as 280700 April 1967, with one company landing in LZ Oriole, Upon completion of this landing, one company landed in LZ Thrush. H-Hour was designated as 280800 April 1967 with one company reinforced by tanks and ontos landing in LVT's over Red Beach. Search and destroy operations were then conduoted from both LZ's and Red Beach, on order.
  2. Chronological sequence of events from 271620 April 1967 through 121900 May 1967:

    271620

    CTG 79.4 received Initiating Directive for Operation Beaver Cage.

    271800

    CTG 79.4 issued Frag Order #1 to BLT 1/3

    271900

    BLT 1/3 issued Frag Order #1 to Operation Order 5-67 to all BLT Units.

    280545

    Land the Landing Force received from CATF. L-Hour confirmed as 0700, H-Hour confirmed as 0800.

    280711

    First two waves into LZ Oriole at coord 186294. No opposition. Co C securing LZ.

    280801

    First wave of LVT's touched down on Red Beach carrying assault waves of Co D.

    280813

    Second wave of LVT's landed on Red Beach with remainder of Co D aboard. 10-15 rounds sniper fire received from VIC 305361. Called for air strike which resulted in good target coverage but negative results.

    280847

    Co C secured objective #2 at coord 187293 and established security.

    280858

    First two waves of Co A into LZ Thrush at Coord 198265. Light sniper fire received.

    280900

    Tank and Ontos serials requested ashore on Red Beach by Co D.

    280900

    Co D moving toward objective 11 at Coord 293371 from Red Beach.

    280919

    Co A received Small Arms Fire VIC. 185265. Returned fire, killed one VC (Conf).

    280935

    A-1-12 commenced lift to Hill 29 with two MRC 109's followed by two 105's.

    281100

    Alpha Command Group landed in LZ Oriole, with recon unit.

    281130

    Co A uncovered 4,000 lbs of rice VIC. 195263.

    281327

    Movement of Co B to LZ Oriole commenced.

    281435

    Co C reported discovery of 3,000 lbs of rice VIC. 183298. Co D detained two VCS near Coord 295376. Co A captured 1 VCS.

    281500

    W-2-12 commenced move into LZ Oriole.

    281555

    Co A received small arms fire VIC. 191262. Returned fire with unkown results.

    281600

    Co C aprehended 2 VCS near Coord 183294.

    281607

    Co A seized Objective #1 at Coord 191259.

    281714

    Received CTG 79.4 Frag Order for operations 281700 to 291630.
    Co A reports two tunnels at Coord 199255 and 198254.

    281715

    Co C captured 2 VCS near 183294.

    281730

    Co D reached Objective # 11 at 293371. Helo lift commenced for Bravo Command Group.

    281845

    BLT 1/3 Frag Order # 2 issued to BLT Units.

    282117

    Co D reports 5 VC located 100 meters from Objective # 11.

    290440

    Co C reports freshly dug fighting holes VIC. 185293.

    290450

    Co D reports one VC seriously wounded VIC. 293372. VC later died of wounds.

    290600

    Co D reports one VC wounded near Objective # 13 Coord 300364.

    290700

    Co C and Co D have commenced attack on Objective #14 and #12, respectively.

    290820

    Co B captured one VC weapon and wounded one VC in fire fight VIC. 195292.

    290850

    CTG 79.4 ordered S & D ops ceased. Co C and Co B to move on Objective # 4 at Coord 165277 with speed and caution.

    290855

    Co D received sniper fire VIC. 289375. Returned fire with unknown results.

    290910

    Co A seized one VCS at 185265.

    291030

    Co A ordered to prepare for helilift from Objective # 3 at 176268 to Objective # 7 Coord 149243. Alpha Command Group and W-2-12 helilifted to Objective #4 at 165277, from LZ Oriole.

    291150

    Co C receiving sniper fire from Objective #4 Coord 165277.

    291200

    First elements Co A seized Objective # 7 Coord 149243.

    291244

    Co C seized and secured Objective # 4 Coord 165277.

    291250

    Co C receiving sniper fire at Objective # 4 Coord 165277.

    291540

    One VC killed by Co D near Objective # 12 at 273393.

    291700

    8 VCS captured by Co D VIC. 273392.

    291856

    Frag Order from CTG 79.4 for operations 291930 to 301630.

    292330

    CTG 79.4 Frag order passed to all units.

    292340

    CTG 79.4 Frag Order modified. Units conduct local S & D ops. Back load tanks, ontos and LVT's from Red Beach at 300700.

    292345

    Co D discovered one spider trap and one Hooch with punjistakes concealed under a false deck at 282388. Destroyed same.

    301140

    SAF delivered against Helos at Coord 159283. Co C fired 60mm mission on Coord 159283 with unknown results.

    301155

    Co C spotted 10 VC in Rice paddy at 438286 (note: recorded coord is in sea; must be inaccurate). Artillery mission fired with 5 enemy KIA probable.

    301330

    Co A receiving automnatic weapons from VIC. 143243. Artillery mission fired without results.

    301500

    Recon killed one VC (Conf) and captured VC near Coord 159252. Also fired artillery mission in that area with unkown results.

    301520

    Co B receiving SAF during lift out from LZ at 175270. One USMC WIA.

    301538

    Co B commenced landing in LZ Cardinal at Coord 128388. Receiving light sniper fire.

    301545

    Co D commenced landing in LZ Buzzard at Coord 132399. No opposition encountered.

    301626

    Co A spotted 6 VC in tree line at Coord 148232. Fired 60mm mortars with unknown results.

    301630

    Co A fired MG and 3.5 at pajama clad VC near objective # 7. Results unkown.

    302200

    Received Frag Order from CTG 79.4 on movement of Co A, W-2-12, and Command Group to LZ Cardinal at coord 128388 on 1 May. Co C to be lifted to LZ Buzzard at 132399. Co A will be lifted out of LZ Robin at 163242 Vice Wren at 145240.

    010900

    Co D received small arms fire from 10 to 12 VC at 144399. VC located in caves and tunnels in that vicinity, Co D sweeping area.

    010920

    Co A spotted 75 to 100 VC on trail near 169240. Artillery fire mission got excellent target coverage. Results unknown.SAF also received from VIC. 165237.

    010930

    Co A captured one VCS at 155278.

    011050

    First wave of Co A into LZ Cardinal. Receiving SAF on choppers out of LZ Robin.

    011153

    Co D had firefight with approximately 10 VC near 135395. VC broke contact and fled with negative results.

    011230

    Co B reported two VC in the open with weapons VIC. 128390. Fired and got one VC KIA (Conf) and one VC KIA (Prob).

    011510

    Co B reported 15 VC in open at 113394. Fired 81 mortars with unknown results.

    011825

    Received Frag Order for operations from 011900 to 021800 from CTG 79.4. Continue S & D Ops.

    011856

    Helilift of Co A and W-2-12 to LZ Cardinal completed.

    012115

    Co B positions at LZ Cardinal probed by two VC. Illumination fired. VC fled. SAF produced negative results.

    020700

    Co's A and C contiunuing Search and Destroy operations in VIC. 1237 and 1239 respectively.

    021005

    Co A received sniper fire from VIC. 125376. Fire returned with negative results.

    021030

    Co C received sniper fire and sighted three VC VIC 125388. Fire returned with negative results. One small tunnel destroyed at same location.

    021100

    Co A patrol blowing numerous caves discovered in vicinity of 120375.

    021305

    Co C Killed woman running from advance party at 118397.

    021445

    Co C taking automatic weapons fire VIC. 115398. Returned fire 81 and 60mm mortars and automatic weapons fire.

    021640

    Co D shot and wounded one VC in VIC. 129382. Three VCS came out of tunnel and were captured.

    021700

    Co A reported point platoon receiving 6 to 8 rounds of SAF from VIC. 120358. Are searching area for VC.

    021930

    Co C under heavy fire from 116384. Co C located at 198385. Co C estimated it was hit by a reinforced platoon. 105mm and 107mm fire was called in, and an emergency air strike requested.

    022100

    Action involving Co C continued. Sparrow Hawk Force alerted for possible insertion to assist. Artillery missions continue firing VIC. 116384 and 110374.

    022200

    Flareship and UH1E Gunships reported on station to assist Co C. Co C receiving mortar fire again. Air strikes on area commenced.

    022300

    Med-Evac and emergency resupply of ammo called for by Co C.

    030645

    Med-Evac and resupply commenced for Co C. Friendly casualties were 4 KIA; 14 WIAE; 6 WIANE. Enemy casualties were 2 KIA confirmed.

    030830

    Sparrow Hawk Force insterted at 120384 to extract Recon element and seize possible enemy mortar positions.

    031830

    Co A water patrol killed two VC at 094356, then came under attack from same area. Four squads commited to assist the water patrol ran into heavy automatic and small arms fire. Artillery and UH1E Gunship support was immediately available to Co A and was utilized throughout the area.

    032200

    All Co A units beyond perimeter at 094362 have returned with WIA's from action near 094356 except for 14 men still cut off.

    032300

    Patrol which was cut off near 094356 has returned with WIA's.

    040550

    Fire mission fired by A-1-12 at 090352 for Co A.

    040625

    Co A reports 60 to 70 VC at 085360. Artillery Fire mission called with unkown results.

    040907

    Brig Gen LaHue, ADC of 1st MarDiv visited BLT 1/3 CP at LZ Cardinal.

    040935

    Co A Friendly and Enemy casualty report received. Friendly casualties 14 KIA; 8 WIAE; 1 WIANE. Enemey casualties 8 KIA (Conf); 6 KIA (Prob).

    040936

    Co D spotted 20 VC at 096404. Fired 81mm mortar mission. Received SAF same location.

    040941

    Co D reports 20 VC confined in village at 095405.

    040953

    Co D requested Med-Evac for one USMC WIA at 098398. Found massive tunnel complex at 085398 and 097404.Requested fire mission, negative results. Requested air.

    041040

    Co D receiving mortar fire and SAF from 107405. Requested Artillery and fixed wing support.

    041131

    Co D has two WIA for emergency Med-Evac.

    041510

    Co C moving near 082386 reports one WIA from SAF. Med-Evac Requested.

    041520

    CAS mission for Co D at 085398 reported 100% on target with 65% coverage of target. Further results unknown.

    041800

    Co C moving to support Co D near hill 65 at 094393. Has Co D in visual contact, receiving sporadic sniper fire.

    041928

    Fire mission at 100403 for Co D. One USMC WIA reported as result of fire mission. Fire mission. Fire was on 50 VC in fortified position.

    042230

    Concept of operations for 5 May received from CTG 79.4.

    042325

    Co D reports all KIA extracted from Battle Zone to friendly lines. One M-60MG with firing mechanism removed, one .45 Cal pistol and one M-16 rifle lost in action. Total casualties: Friendly 11 KIA; 20 WIAE; 6[?] WIANE. Enemy Casualties - Unknown.

    050120

    Co D called artillery illumination mission to observe VC moving in area.

    050202

    Enemy appears to be slipping away to the SW. Distance too great for effective SAF. One Co D patrol still in contact.

    050500

    VC broke contact with Co D patrol. Continuing to move away to the southwest.

    050618

    Co D receiving SAF and automatic weapons fire from 104403. Fire mission called on 15 VC digging in Village at that location. Excellent coverage on target.

    050955

    Co's C and D attacking fortified positions at 116395, receiving sporadic fire. Bravo Company maneuvering in trace of Co C and D after departing LZ Cardinal. Co B lifted to LZ Eagle at 095392. Co A lifted to LZ Magpie at 031341 from LZ Finch at 095392.

    051405

    At 108382 Co B reported one man stepped on surprise firing device causing WIA's.

    051430

    Co's C and B sweeping objective near 097402. Co C reports huge tunnel complex at 100402. Requests lights and demo to search and destroy this complex.

    051500

    CH-53, CH-46, and UH34D's arrived in LZ Cardinal without prior notification of lift A-1-12 and Bravo Command Group to LZ Magpie at 031341.

    051815

    LZ Cardinal under heavy attack from 82mm mortars, and SAF and automatic wpns fire from all sides. CAS called and response was immediate with 2 F-9's, 2 UH1E Gunships and Puff assisting. 10 VC KIA (Conf) 20 VC KIA (Prob). PA One 82mm mortar destroyed.

    052000

    All elements safely out of LZ Cardinal and into LZ Magpie without casualties.

    061000

    6 VC reported by Co B digging in at 044376. Artillery mission fired. Results unknown.

    061125

    Co C receiving sniper fire from 085393. 2 USMC WIA. Returned fire with 60mm mortars.

    061200

    Co B receiving light SAF near 090392. Returned fire with 3.5. 2 USMC WIA. 2 VC KIA (Prob).

    061730

    Co B reports 15 VC opened up on rear element of Company at 070389. Returned fire with small arms and M-79. 5 Enemy KIA (Prob).

    061815

    Co D reports receiving sniper fire from 060385.

    062045

    Co A and BLT 1/3 CP at LZ Magpie. Co B at Coord 072395. Co C at 062398. Co D at 057395.

    071045

    Company B receiving sniper fire from 2 or 3 persons at 050399. Returned fire with 81mm mortars.

    071215

    Co B received SAF from VIC. 050396. Returned fire. 3 enemy KIA (Prob).

    071345

    All companies turning in Flak Vests to increase mobility and decrease load.

    071545

    Co D reported tunnel complex at 035375 containing some items of intelligence value.

    071700

    Co C reports two snipers VIC. 069398. Returned fire. One VC KIA (Conf) and one VC KIA (Prob).

    071845

    Position reports received from companies operating outside LZ Magpie. Co C Coord 023399; Co B Coord 021383; Co D Coor 030385.

    072050

    Fire Mission on reported VC Battalion of 300 men moving VIC. 055371 resulted in a secondary explosion. More fire missions are being fired.

    072050

    Received Frag Order from CTG 79.4 for operations 8 May 1967. Co D reports movement at 030388. Fired 81 mission.

    072137

    Co D reports it is under mortar attack from Coord 038395. Artillery mission fired. Friendly casualties: one KIA; 2 WIAE; 4 WIANE.

    072220

    Co C received six rounds of ineffective mortar fire on position from VIC. 031391. Fire mission called on that location.

    072325

    Casualty figures at this point in the operation are Friendly: 30 KIA; 55 WIA; 30 WIANE. Enemy: 55 KIA (Conf); 77 KIA (Prob), 8 captured, and 24 VCS (Detained).

    081035

    Co C captured 5 VCS of military age with packet of papers, money, fresh haircuts and false or no ID cards.

    081045

    Co C reported mortar attack on 023399 from VIC. 031391. Artillery and air requested. 81's attempted to return fire but were hit by incoming.

    081102

    Co D receiving mortar fire. Co B 81's moving into [...] to assist Co C. Mortars located by recon elements at 032392. Co D reports 3 WIANE, non serious.

    081200

    More incoming mortars on Co C at 023399, 1UH1E Gunship and fixed wing attack at 033393 and 033395 got 100% target coverage. One mortar position destroyed, 5 VC KIA (Conf). Friendly casualties 3 KIA; 8 WIAE; 2 WIANE.

    081343

    Recon reports 6 VC pinned down at 032379. Fire mission fired with unknown results.

    081620

    Heavy punji trap area reported at coord 001371 by recon.

    081725

    Frag warning order received by BLT 1/3 from CTG 79.4 to be prepared to reorient operations toward LZ Cardinal.

    081935

    Co B captured one VCS at Coord 002370.

    082020

    Received intelligence report that one VC company was operating VIC. Coord 002370. Passed to Co B.

    082400

    Received Frag order from CTG 79.4 for operations on 9 May 1967. Operations are oriented toward LZ Cardinal over same route covered to arrive at present locations. Co A and BLT 1/3 CF remain at LZ Magpie. Present positions: Co B Coord 002375; Co C Coord 001370; Co D Coord 009386; Recon element Coord 021380.

    090455

    BLT 1/3 Frag order issued to units.

    090600

    Co's B, C and D are moving through area Coord 0137, 0138, 0139 on local search and destroy operations.

    090640

    Co C receiving incoming mortar fire from VIC. 015375 and 012385. Co D firing mortars to assist. Request for UH1E Gunship support. Co D also firing 3.5 and M-60's on enemy positions. Co C using mortars to return fire. Co C received one WIANE from mortar attack.

    090730

    CAS on VIC. of mortar positions. results: good target coverage Enemy casualties unknown.

    090906

    Co B captured 7 VCS VIC. 010385.

    091005

    Casualties as of 090900 May 1967 for BLT 1/3 KIA 33; WIAE 76; WIANE 21.

    091300

    Co D spotted 3 VC at 015403. One VC KIA (Prob) from SAF.

    091730

    CTG 79.4 issued SiteRep on Amphibious Withdrawal, confirming BLT 1/3 sweep to the east toward the coast. Directed to coordinate sweep with 1stBn 5th Marines on right flank.

    091905

    Co D sighted 4 VC at 025403. Ambush in progress. VC escaped without contact.

    092230

    BLT 1/3 issued Frag Order # 11 to Op Order 5-67 for sweep operations on 10 May 67 East toward the coast.

    100730

    Co's B and C at Phase line Alpha on north south line from 0241 through 020387 continuing sweep to east. Co D in trace moving down center of valley.

    100740

    Bravo Co receiving SAF and automatic wpns fire from Hill 110 at 033386.

    100750

    Co C firing mortars on Hill 110, Co B returning fire on Hill 110 with 60 and 81mm mortars, 3.5 rkts and automatic wpns. Request for UH1E Gunship support.

    100822

    Hill 100 [Hill 110] being worked over by Gunships and automatic fire.

    100830

    Co B reports one WIA. Request Med-Evac.

    100848

    Co B reports VC moving toward Co B from left rear request Co C to check it out and assist.

    100849

    Co D reports Co C, 1/5 is 300 meter west of Hill 110 moving east.

    100852

    Co B located at 034387; Co C at 034395; Co D at 025388.

    100853

    Co B taking heavy sniper fire. Reports 20 VC moving East.

    100906

    Co C moving 3d Plat to left flank of Co B.

    100915

    Co B taking mortar fire at a rate of one round per minute.

    100925

    Co B pinned down by heavy fire. Suffering unknown number of KIA and WIA. Requesting close air support. Co C attempting to envelope village at 035395 with one platoon to stop enemy fire from that vicinity. Enveloping platoon receiving mortar fire.

    100930

    Request from Co B for Co C and D to link up on left and right flanks respectively.

    100935

    Co C, 1/5 moving toward Hill 110 sweep toward the east. Air strike will be run on Hill 110 prior to sweep.

    100949

    Co B reports one company of VC wearing green uniforms and helmets, well camoflaged and entrenched on Hill 100.

    100951

    Co C has one platoon pinned down by heavy fire from village at 035395.

    101025

    Air strike run on VIC. 033385. 5 VC KIA (Prob) and a secondary explosion. Air strike also run at Coord 025384. 5 VC KIA (Conf) KBA.

    101030

    Current situation has Co B on stream facing Hill 110 with Co C on left flank and Co B on right flank.

    101039

    Co C, 1/5 sweeping Hill 110, has control of objective. Co C needs help on left flank. Withdrawing platoon from right flank to assist left flank platoon pinned down by heavy fire.

    101045

    One platoon of Co D moving down to left flank to assist Co C. Co B reports VC moving east away from Hill 110.

    101054

    Co C has VC in trench line directly in front of position delivering heavy fire. Units are pinned down.

    101210

    Heavy contact continuing. Air strike run on Coord 044387. 50% Coverage of target.

    101259

    Co D now has two platoons commiited to right flank of Co B.

    101340

    Co B reports approximately 6 KIA and 23 WIA, all friendly, in Co C zone. Sparrow Hawk arrived in zone with 40 men at approximately 1300. Suffered 5 WIA almost immediately. Remaining personnel pinned down in LZ.

    101536

    Heavy contact continues. Co B reports VC attempting to move out to the east, after air strike throughout the area.

    101600

    Contact light. Units cosolidating positions and establishing perimeter for the night. Co's B, C, and D under control of 1/5. Received Frag order for night activities from 1/5.

    102330

    Position report of Co's B, C, and D. Co B at 036389; Co C at 036391; Co D at 030389. Units tied together in a perimeter for the night.

    111100

    Casualties reported for action 10 May 1967. Friendly: 22 KIA, 62 WIAE, 26 WIANE, Enemy: 86 KIA (Conf)

    111645

    Co's B, C, D and Mini Cmd Group moving East toward LZ Quail at 060377.

    112100

    Position report on all units submitted to CTG 79.4. Co A and BLT 1/3 at Coord 044342; Mini Cmd Group at 044390; Co B at 044390; Co C at 045396; Co D 042392. Perimeter established for night defense.

    112200

    Frag Order received from CTG 79.4 for Amphibious withdrawal to ships of ARG 76.4.

    121400

    All elements of Co's B, C, D and Mini Comd Group have departed LZ Quail at 060377. LZ Quail secured by 3/5.

    121900

    All Units of BLT 1/3 are aboard ships of ARG 76.4. Operation Beaver Cage completed.

  3. Recapitulation of major moves by helicopter of BLT 1/3 during Operation Beaver Cage. Note: Ordered number () was not provided

    280700 April 1967

    C Company landed in LZ Oriole at Coord 186294.

    280900

    A Company landed in LZ Thrush at Coord 198265.

    280935
    A-1-12 lifted to Hill 29 at Coord 226320 with two 105's and 18 personnel.
    281100

    Alpha Command Group and Recon Platoon landed in LZ Oriole at Coord 186294.

    281330

    B Company landed in LZ Oriole at Coord 1866294.

    281530

    W-2-12 landed in LZ Oriole at Coord 185294.

    281730

    Bravo Command Group landed in LZ Oriole at Coord 186294.

    291030

    Command Group and W-2-12 lifted from LZ Oriole to objective # 4 at Coord 165277.

    291030

    A Company lifted from objective # 3 at Coord 176268 to objective #7 at Coord 149243 (LZ Wren).

    301530

    B Company lifted from 165277 to LZ Cardinal at 128388.

    301700

    D Company lifted from 284388 to LZ Buzzard at Coord 132399.

    011050 May 1967

    A Company lifted from LZ Robin at Coord 162242 to LZ Cardinal at Coord 128388.

    011300

    C Company lifted from 165277 to LZ Buzzard at coord 132399.

    011500

    Command Group and W-2-12 lifted from 165277 to LZ Cardinal.

    020900

    A-1-12 lifted from Hill 29 at Coord 226320 and LSD to LZ Cardinal.

    050700

    B Company lifted from LZ Cardinal at Coord 128388 to LZ Eagle at Coord 095392.

    050930

    A Company lifted from LZ Finch at Coord 094358 to LZ Magpie at Coord 031341.

    051500

    A-1-12, W-2-12, Command Group (255 personnel) moved from LZ Cardinal to LZ Magpie at Coord 031341.

    120900

    B, C, and D Companies lifted from LZ Quail at Coord 060377 to ships of ARG 76.4.

    121200

    A-1-12, W-2-12, Company A, and command group lifted from LZ Magpie at Coord 031341 to ships of ARG 76.4.

Results

Because of the requirement to move very rapidly and to cover large areas of terrain the Battalion could not adequately search and destroy where heavy contact had occurred. Therefore, the enemy losses may have been much higher than these figures listed below.

  1. Over all enemy losses
    • 181 KIA (Conf)
    • 136 KIA (Prob)
    • 66 VC prisoners and detainees
  2. Enemy Equipment, Material and Weapons Captured:
    1. Two 60mm Mortar Sights
    2. Six SKS Soviet 7.62mm Semiautomatic Carbines
    3. 2 AK-47 7.62 Assault Guns
    4. One 7.62 Heavy MG SG 43 & SGM
    5. Two Carbines US 30 Cal. M1
    6. 2 NVA diaries
    7. 3 wallets containing pictures of NVA soldiers and anti-american literature
    8. 1 VC/NVA medical bag
    9. 1 medical handbook
    10. 25 rouinds of 60mm mortar rounds
    11. 25 CHICOM grenades
    12. 500 rounds small arms ammunition
    13. punji traps and sticks
    14. 6 fuses for 60mm mortars
  3. Enemy Equipment, Material and Weapons Destroyed:
    1. One 60mm Mortar Sight
    2. One 7.62 heavy MG 43 and SGM
    3. 25 rounds 60mm mortar
    4. 25 CHICOM Grenades
    5. 500 rounds small arms ammunition
    6. 6 fuses for 60mm mortars
    7. assortment of VC/NVA 782 gear: 22 cartridge belts, 13 entrenching tools and 9 canteens
  4. Friendly Casualties:
    • 54 KIA
    • 1 DOW
    • 151 WIAE
    • 50 WIANE
  5. Friendly equipment lost or destroyed:
    • 3-AN/PRC - 25
    • 7-.45 Cal Pistols
    • 1-M-79
    • *9-M-16 rifles
    • 1-pr 7.50 Binoculars
    • 3-M1ZZ Tripods
    • 1-TAI telephone
    • 1-M-14 rifle

Commander's Analysis

  1. Problems encountered. The basic BLT concept applied to waterbornse elementslanded over the beach and helicopterborne elements landed abnormally deep inland intensified the problems of control and at times exceeded the command and capabilities of the BLT. In effect, two separate operations resulted. The use of a BLT as a subordinate command where major support units are not fragmented to task[...] organizations unnecessarily burdens the BLT with the problems of providing logistical support and security for numerous elements of the BLT, as well as causing serious distractions from the essential task of directing the Infantry Battalion. Briefings particularly with regard to overall missions and general plan were not adequate.
  2. CA/PsyWar. The CA/PsyWar aspects of the operation were not covered by instructions. Resettlement of refugees, and re-distribution of captured food were not provided for. Except for MedCap activities in the government controlled area of Que Son BT0334 and a very few individual able-bodies males who were able to obtain sanctuary with a rifle unit nothing constructive was offered nor was feasible. No CA/PsyWar objectives were set forth.

Lessons Learned

  1. Item: Rapid Movement.
    1. Rapid movement through an area which has been occupied by the enemy for a long time permits the enemy to deliver accurate incoming sniper and mortar fire. It is imperative that the maneuvering unit be alloted a reasonable period of time during which enemy emplacements, caves and tunnels can be located and destroyed. On one of several occasions, an area, previously swept, developed into a fortified position when moved through again a day later. The area was known to be heavily tunneled but time could not be spent after the initial discovery because of the requirement to move. Disoovered enemy fortifications must be destroyed when first located and the maneuvering elements schedule should be flexible enough to allow this.
    2. The amount of demolitions required to destroy extensive enemy positions cannot be packed by the search and destroy unit. A requirement exists to have a ready supply of demolitions located in the immediate area of the Battalion TAOR/ZOA with additional qualified personnel ready for helilift to the using unit.

  2. Item: Movement Pattermns and Terrain Utilization.

    Discussion:

    Units maneuvering in the field must avoid a set schedule of movement and vary their utilization of terrain.

    Companies working in assigned TAOR's or 8S part of a Battalion effort should normally avoid setting in night positions prior to darkness, and should be moving by dawn. Any delay after first light invites inooming sniper and mortar fire. Further, companies should attempt to disguise their direction of movement especially just prior to darkness. Maximum utilization of concealment is mandatory. The enemy is capable of making "educated" guesses as to possible friendly night positions unless deception is used.

    Early daylight and late afternoon resupply by helicopter should be employed infrequently and then only for emergency or to break the midday pattern. Resupply of friendly units should occur between the hours of 1000 to 1400, and should be executed as rapidly as possible. This is especially true in the high temperature/ humidity areas of Vietnam when these hours prove to be the least productive period. Intensive patrolling and ambushes must be carried on duriag the halt.

    Night movement of units can be used to deceive the enemy. This must depend on the commanders knowledge of the terrain and a reconnaissance of the area prior to movement.

    After night positions have been selected, and while the unit is moving toward its night positions, forward observers and forward air control1ers should be compUing likely H& I and TPQ,-10 targets. The process is a continuous one but acheives a greater degree of importance in the area of the night position. The Battalion FSCC then can supplement this target list to ensure a balanoed night fire plan.

    To continuously selectt highground as final night defensive positions is undesirable. Rioe paddies and village positions in the lowground can be used; outposts and patrols attain added importance. In selective lowground positions, care must be taken to ensure the establishment of internal security posts to prevent the enemy's sudden appearance within the perimeter from hidden cave & tunnels. Movement should be held to a minimum after dark within the perimeter and if messenger runs must be made, at least two runners should be sent together.

  3. Item: General Comments Concerning Air/Infantry Teamwork.

    Discussion:

    1. On a company level a definite requirement exists for the landing zone to be supervised by one company representative such as the Company gunnery Sergeant, First Sergeant, who is current in both the tactical and logistical situations and who can coordinate HST/TACP efforts towards resupply, Med Evac, etc.
    2. Each fire team of a unit must have air panels and display these panels whenever air is to be utilized in support. i.e. resupply, UH1E Gunship support, fized wing close air strikes.
    3. Smoke signals to make landing zones should be used only when requested by the incoming helicopter pilot. Smoking a zone should not be done automatically.
    4. Rapid moving tactical situations can suddenly preclude the use of CAS already requested. Commanders should, therefore, have secondary targets preselected for his support. The TACP representative with each company can maintain a current list of targets for the commanders.
    5. The selection of landing zones must be made in accordance with the following guidelines:
      1. Satisfactory size clearance, degree of slope.
      2. Capable of receiving resupply and sending out Med-Evacs even if company is in contact.
      3. Must not be centrally located to the point of exposing company CP, mortar positions etc. to high volume of incoming fire.
      4. LZ must be secured and marked with air panels.
    6. Med-Evac helicopters must be used for Med-Evacs only, and should not be directed to acoomplish other missions.
    7. Helicopters provide a ready supply of smoke for front lines units. In an emergency chiefs can supply a limited supply of smoke granades.
    8. All air agencies supporting an operation must be aware of the thrust point system in that area. Positions of friendlies are being compromised by the requirement that positions must be sent in the clear to helioopter elements etc.

  4. Item: The Battalion CP.

    Discussion: The Battalion Command Post must be flexible enough to adjust its size to meet the tactical situation. A highly mobile command group consists of the following: Battalion CO, Radio Operator for Regt TAC, Radio Operator for Bn TAC, S-3, S-3 assist, FSCC, Radio Operator for Arty Conduct of Fire, Radio Operator for TACP net.

  5. Item: Lightening the load.

    Discussion: In a moving sitaution, search and destroy or sweep operation, the additional weight of the second 81mm mortar in the section does not appear to warrant its being carried. A solution to this appears to be to drop the one gun, and utilize the personnel for carrying more ammo for the remaining gun.

  6. Item: Communications.

    Discussion:

    1. Because of the operating distances involved between the Battalion and its companies and between the Battalion and higher Headquarters, radio was the primary and the only means of communications. Weather and terrain were generally favorable to good voice communications and consequent communication was reliable throughout the two week deployment.
    2. Post operation lim!ted technical inspection of radios and telephones disclosed no equipment faiures or malfunctions. However loss and [...] of radio accessories has dropped the availability of PRC-25 radios to a critical low.
    3. From the time that the BLT embarked on Okinawa through the end of Operation Beaver Cage, situations arose whioh, as they compounded, threatened the maintenance of adequate communications support of the BLT's mission in the joint operation. For the benefit ot future SLF's it is felt they are worthy of mention.
      1. It became aparrent upon embarkation that the troop radio equipment on board the LPH was inadequate to meet even minimum requirements of the SLFF. Attempt to rectify this deficiency in the Phillipines were not successful because of early deployment to the coast of Vietnam. Out of necessity the BLT and the SLF installed their organic equipment on board to supplement troop radio. A later requirement for the establishment of an SLF oommand post ashore and communications equipment for three liaison offioers to various adjacent organizations began to see the personnel and equipment organic to the SLF and the BLT spread sparsely.
      2. These last two requirements came to light after the Battalion was deployed so far inland that it had been necessary to establish a two vehicle relay station in order to communicate with the LPH and the other ships whioh comprised our TACLOG.
      3. Ultimately it became necessary to utilize message center, wire, and attached radio relay personnel to meet the requirements of manning radios around the clock.
      4. A suggested solution is to augment the SLF staff with additional communicators and equipment prior to deployment in order to handle TACLOG and liaison communications, rather than tasking the Infantry Battalion to meet all unforseen oommunioations needs whioh can arise on speculative operations.

  7. Item: Resupply.

    Discussion:

    1. On several occasions resupply was not accomplished when and where desired due to non-availability of the UH-34 support helioopters. These aircraft were being utilized for tactioal or Med-Evac lifts. A solution to this difficulty would be to provide CH-46 aircraft to augment UH-34's for resupply.
    2. Timeliness of emergency resupply of class V was found to be a problem on one occasion at night. For convenienoe, the problem was solved by deliveries directly from the LPH support ship. An in country supply source for SLF support is considered highly desirable because of the availability of class I, II, IV and V supplies.
    3. Aircraft availability was not at a level to provide normal resupply on an on call basis. It was necessary that the tactioal plan allow for a position of the day set aside for resupply of units. The most sucoessful time for localre- supply of companies was during midday between the hours of 1100 - 1400, however due to situational dictates no pattern of resupply was set. Midday resupply was considered to be the best solution because it allows freedom of movement iin early morning and evening during the most critical time periods and when the most progress is made.
    4. The problems of resupply communications from the central LZ to units resupplied was solved quite satisfactorily by use of the HST net. Serving as the administrative and logistics net, the HST net relieved the burden from the Battalion Tactical Net.
    5. The most feasible and practical manner of resupply was found to be from the central LZ to the using units rather than direct from in country or ship board sources. This enabled greater positive control and ooordination. The pilots may be given ourreat local LZ coordinates, and conditions at the unit LZ'S.
    6. Control and accounting for individual equipment and weapons of KIA WIA personnel was a problem. Our experience indicates that Med Evacuated personnel must be evacuated with their equipmeat tagged. Personal equipment should not be evacuated via resupply helicopters that are subject to frag orders changing destination and resulting in temporary or permanent loss of equipment. If due to weight limitations of the Med Evac helicopter; personal gear is not evacuated with the casualty, it could be returned via resupply helicopter to the central LZ for further delivery to designated receiving locators.
    7. There were occasions when units requesting resupply experienced difficulty in determining exact requirements dut to the changing nature of the tactical situation. Extreme care, forethought and screening must be taken by the requesting [...] to avoid receiving burdensome excess ammunition or other supplies.
    8. Companies submiting resupply request during the evening prior to delivery the following day were supplied on a "fill or kill" basis. This made the resupply chain function smoother as records of supplies requested and those delivered were not necessary. If a company did not receive an item/items, he would resubmit the following day, if the requirement still existed. If the requirement did not exist the following day the item/items were deleted.

P.A. Wickwire signature
P. A. WICKWIRE

Operation Overlay Diagram