Operation Beau Charger Command Chronology

From the Vietnam War Period of May 14, 1967 Through May 31, 1967

Posted on Jun 1, 2020 (last modified May 8, 2021)

This document is a declassified record of the Vietnam War from the period of May 14, 1967 to May 31, 1967, which generally pertains to the operation known as "Beau Charger". The document was transcribed from a PDF file for the purpose of making it more useful for research (i.e. more legible, hyperlinked, and searchable). In some places, the scanned source document was somewhat illegible. The following symbology is used to reflect what was questionable during the transcription:

[?] = One character exists here that is completely illegible or highly questionable.
[X?] = Character here looks like character in brackets, but is questionable to some degree.
[O or 0] = May be first of second character within brackets.
[…] = Several characters or words of unrecognizable text.

Source: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY for 14-31 May 1967 [BLT 1/3], 31 May 1967, Box __, Folder 039, US Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1201039032, Accessed 29 May 2020.

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 1/3
Regimental Landing Team-26
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, F[?]F
FPO, San Francisco 96602

1/swd
5750
SerNo: 00[?]-67
31 May 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: CTG 79.4

Subj: Command Chronology for period 14 May 1967 through 31 May 1967

Ref:

MCO 5750.2A
Brig[O or 0] 5750.1A
FMFPACO 5750.8

Encl: (1) Battalion Landing Team 1/3 Command Chronology

In accordance with the provisions of references (a) through (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.
Downgrade at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years.

P.A. Wickwire signature
P. A. WICKWIRE

INDEX

PART I — ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
PART II — NARRATIVE SUMMARY
PART III – SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
PART IV — SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

PART I – ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

Designation	Commander
Battalion Landing Team 1/3 `[…]`	LtCol P. A. WICKWIRE

Subordinate Units

Designation	Commander
H&S Company	Capt J. H. MACK
Company A	Capt C. G. JORDAN
Company B	Capt J. C. SHIRLEY
Company C	Capt G. F. RECZEK
Company D	Capt E. P. ALDOUS Jr.

(Attached Units)

Designation	Commander
Det HqCo, 9thMAB (Radio Relay)	Cpl J. N. MAGGI
Det 15th MedBn	Lt D. M. MC GINN
Det Postal Section Hq Bn 3dMarDiv	Sgt W. A. LEDFORD
Det Photo Section HqBn 3dMarDiv	Cpl B. L. AXELROD
Det Disbursing Section Hq Bn 3dMarDiv	Capt C. B. YELLIG
Det Hq Bn RLT-26 (Radio Relay)	Cpl K. K. FROST
Btry A (Rein), 1stBn, 12thMar	Capt D. J. HARRINGTON
107mm MtrBtry, 2dBn, 12thMar	Capt A. M. PATTERSON
1stPlt (Rein), CoB 1stAmTracBn	1stLt S. J. BROWN
3dPlt (Rein), CoA 3dATBn	2dLt W. M. HAYES (14 - 26 May 67) SSgt J. SEPULVEDA-HERNANDEZ (29 - 31 May 67)
3dPlt (Rein), CoC 3dTankBn	2dLt L. D. DOBBIN [KIA?] (14 - 1`[?]` May 67) [...] [1...] May 67) 2dLt. W M. HAYES (29 - 31 May 67)
2dPlt (Rein), CoA 3dEngrBn	2dLt F. G. WENTWORTH
1stPlt, Co B 3dReconBn	2dLt R. H. FREEMAN
1st Clearing Plt (Rein), CoB 3dMedBn	Lt R. G. SCHEIBE, USN
Det 3dServBn (Provided by FLC)	Lt. F. J. HAUGH
2dPlt (Rein), CoB 3dSPBn	2dLt K. A. WYMER
1stPlt (Rein), CoB 3dMTBn	2dLt. D. M. BYSTEDT

Location

14 - 17 May 1967 - Afloat with CTG 79.4
18 - 26 May 1967 - Operation Beau Charger RVN
27 - 31 May 1967 - Afloat with CTG 79.4

Staff Officers

Executive Officer	Maj B. D. THORNBURY
S-1	2dLt E. W. STERLING
S-2	CWO P. B. MURPHY
S-3	Maj R. C. OSSENFORT
S-4	Capt P. N. HENDRIX

Average Monthly Strength

USMC Officers	Enlisted	USN Officers	Enlisted	Other
57	1404	7	78	None

PART II – NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the period of 14 - 17 May BLT 1/3 conducted repair and rehabilitation aboard the ships of ARG 76.4, following Operation Beaver Cage.

On 18 May BLT 1/3 commenced Operation "Beau Charger", landing in the DMZ with the mission of removing civilians and destroying all military forces and installations in the southern sector of the DMZ. BLT 1/3's sector of operations was adjacent to the Gulf of Tonkin and [..] support of the multi-battalion joint US - ARVN Operation "Hickory" conducted to the west in the DMZ south of the Ben Hai River. The assault was conducted [...] for Company D to Green Beach and by helicopter for Company A and Company [?] inland to Landing Zone Goose and Owl. Company D landed without incident, but the first waves of Company A landed in the midst of elements of a surprised, and well entrenched , enemy battalion. Heavy fighting ensued.Succ[eeding essive?] waves of each company were landed further to the rear in Landing Zone Owl, and, reinforced with tanks and one platoon from Company D, advanced to relieve the forward elements. Further advance was impossible and friendly troops were withdrawn a short distance to facilitate an air strike. After eleven aircraft, of four different models, had hit enemy positions, friendly elementsadvanced with minimal resistance.

During the next two days Company D established a BSA on Green Beach, coordinates 275780 while Company A, Company C and Company B advanced north to the DMZ and then turned [...] south. At this point the enemy changed his tactics. Personnel and small arms attacks became almost non-existant, however enemy mortar and artillary attacks from across the Ben Hai River began to pound all BLT 1/3 units in the area with frequency and accuracy. Air, counter-battery artillery and naval gun fire were used in supression attempt with excellent results.

On 19 May the BSA, consisting of Company D, A/1/12, W/2/12 and BLT 1/3 command elements, was hit by an intense barrage of 85mm gun fire that killed four Marines and destroyed one how[...]. On [?] May the BSA moved to a more tenable location to the south at White Beach coordinates 325718. Contact of all types lessened considerably from this time on, consisting mostly of friendly outposts interrupting small enemy rocket and mortar teams at night, and sporadic and innacurate enemy supporting arms fire.

On 23 May BLT 1/3 observed the 24 hour truce without violation.

During the push south most of the villagers encountered were friendly and pacified and seemed relieved at the Marine's arrival. With the help of a local police company all indigenous personnel were evacuated from the BLT 1/3 sector of the DMZ.

On the night of 25 - 26 May, with its mission accomplished, BLT 1/3 conducted an amphibious withdrawal by small boat and helicopter.

Operation Beau Charger was marked not only by the rapid and complete accomplishment of the evacuate-and-destroy mission, but also by the capture of enemy equipment including five [...] rocket launchers; numerous small arms weapons, some of full automatic Chinese manufacture; and bodies, uniforms, and papers of both Viet Cong and NVA origin.

Interesting tactical considerations included the extensive use of aerial observation, the use of naval gunfore as the major long range supporting arm, and the use of Amphibious Tractors vice helicopters as the primary resupply, medevac, and troop movement vehicle.

The operation cost the [BLT?] 23 KIA and 99 WIA. It cost the enemy 85 KIA (confirmed) 87 KIA (probable).

The period 27 -31 May was spent aboard the ships of TG 76.4 in preparation for additional operations.

PART III – SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Sequence of Events:

14 - 17 May: BLT 1/3 was aboard ships of ARG 76.4 preparing personnel and equipment and planning for the subsequent operation.
18 May: Operation Beau Charger was initiated at 0800 with simultaneous heliborne and amphibios assaults by two rifle companies in the DMZ. The remaining rifle companies, Battalion Command Group and support elements were subsequently landed and a BSA was established near the southern boundary of the DMZ. Heavy enemy activity was encountered throughout the day by the three reinforced rifle companies which pushed north toward the Ben Hai River. NVA mortar, automatic weapons and small arms fire resulted in 17 U. S. KIA and 55 U. S. WIA while U. S. fire inflicted 60 enemy KIA (confirmed), 22 KIA (probable), one NVA captured and 43 non-combatants evacuated from the DMZ.
19 May: The offensive drive toward the DMZ was continued throughout the day. Eight CAS missions were run against heavily defended fortified villages with excellent results. total casualties inflicted on the enemy for the day included 15 KIA (cofirmed) , 56 KIA (probable) and 2 NVA captured. Three 140mm rocket launchers were captured and 274 non-combatants were evacuated. Three 85mm artillery attacks of approximately 125 rounds from north of the DMZ were directed at the BSA. Counter battery fire by the BLT's two artillery batteries and naval gunfire were directed against these positions with unknown results. The day's action cost a total of 5 U. S. KIA and 35 WIA.
20 May: Search and destroy operations were conducted with the direction of advance being toward the south. 4 KIA (confirmed) abd [?] KIA (probable) were inflicted on the enemy with one 140mm rocket launcher and four AK-47 rifles captured. 135 non-combatant personnel were evacuated. 1 U. S. KIA and 5 WIA were sustained.
21 May: Search and destroy operations continued while advancing in a southerly direction. One KIA (confirmed) and one KIA (probable) were inflicted on the enemy while two U. S. WIA was sustained. Eighty-four non-combatants were evacuated from the DMZ.
22 May: Units continued search and clear operations with no enemy contact.
23 May: Units observed 24 hour truce in honor of Buddha's birthday. No [...?incidents] occured. At 1600 one tank hit an explosive device and was badly damaged. 2 U. S. WIA were sustained.
24 May: Units moved south of the southern boundary of the DMZ in a search and clear operation. Sporadic mortar and artillery fire was received with no casualties sustained.
25 May: At 1445 the BSA received ten rounds of incoming 85mm fire and ine 1[2?]0mm mortar round. All fire missed friendly positions. Units conducted search and clear operations while advancing south to the vicinity of the Th[...] H[?]n River. At 1600 all companied began moving toward the BSA along three separate axis. At 2000 Company [?], Ontos ans A/1/12 were backloaded for withdrawal. Communications deception was used and the systematic withdrawal of all units progressed without incident.
26 May: At 0200 Company A withdrew from the AOA followed by Company C, Bravo Command Group at 0800, and tanks at 0930. Company D covered the wiithdrawal and was itself extracted from the AOA at 1010. No incidents or enemy contact occurred during the withdrawal.
27 - 31 May: The BLT conducted refurbishment and repair of equipment aboard ships of ARG 76.4

Personnel

Replacements: 5 Officers, 135 Enlisted
Casualties: 23 KIA, 73 WIAE, 26 WIANE
Awards: 173 Purple Hearts, 5 zBronze Stars
Postal, ersonnel accounting and promotions are satifactory.

Administration

Company administration is functioning smoothly under the supervision of Company Commanders and Company Firt Sergeants.

Command Relations

Battalion Landing Team 1/3 in OP[...] CTG 79.4 [...] 9thMAB.

Intelligence

Enemy forces on Operation Beau Charger/Hickory while cocnducting search and destroy operations was estimated to be one unidentified NVA battalion and one LF VC/NVA company.

Contact was mad with an estimated two VC/NVA companies during the first three days of Search and Destroy operations. Enemy losses for the period were 85 KIA confirmed, 84 KIA probable and 6 VCS/POW captured (1 POW DO[?]). Weapons/equipmentcaptured; 18 SKS/AK-47 rifles, 5 104mm rocket launchers, 2 [?]-40/RPG-2 A. T. launchers and 2 [...] field phones, 2 NVA wallets, 5 documents (not yet translated), 2 medical kits and 3 signalling drums. Also 14 sticks of explosive material, 31 blasting caps and 5 CHICOM grenedes (which were destroyed).

Close Air Support

During Operation Beau Charger (18 - 26 May), HMM-263 flew 1237 UH-34 sorties, 75 [...] [Gunship?] sorties, and 132 CH-46 sorties; while the 1stMAW and 7th Air Force flew [12?] 01-[E?] observation, spotting and TACA sorties and 42 fixed wing strike sorties in support.

Logistics

Supply.
During this period approximately 90 requisitions were placed through FSR with 18[?] completed. For Operation Beau Charger/HIckory explendable supplied were furnished by LSA Dong Ha, RVN.

Small arms ordinance abd 3.5 rocket launchers requiring c[...]/repair were evacuated to FSR Da Nang. The following major items of [...] to combat loss/damage: 1 LVT, 2M48A3 tanks and 2 107mm Howtars.
Maintenance.
During the period limited [...] provided by attached LSU detachment from 3d Service [...].
Transportation.
BLT 1/3 was aboard [...] Beau Charger/Hickory during this period, therefore [...]tot transportation was utilized.
Fiscal.
Project 24 funds expended during this periodamounted to [?]7,670.00.
Embarkation.
On 18 May personnel and equipment were debarked in RVN to participate in Operation Beau Charger/Hickory abd reembarked on 26 May aboard the USS Okinawa LPH-3, USS Bayfield APA-33, USS Point Defiance LSD-31 and the USS Seminole AKA-104. On 27 May personnel, supplies and equipment were transferred from the USS Bayfield APA-33 which was relieved by the USS Duluth LPD-6.

Close Combat

During this reporting period, a heavy enemy contact was made as previously described. Analysing this close combat situation and the one involving the [... BLT?] just prior to this period, certain distinct enemy tactical trends appear [to develop?].

In both situations the enemy engaged friendly forces at extremely close range (20 - 200 meters) reducing friendly capabilities to withdraw and fully utilize supporting arms. During the close fighting it was obvious the enemy was thoroughly schooled to concentrate their fires on firendly machine gun teams and other key personnel and elements. In both situations when it became clear the enemy could not stop friendly advances, the enemy used the cover of darkness to break contact. Well qualified snipers remained in position to harrass friendly advances until the sniper was ov[erun?] and/or killed.

PART IV – SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

BLT 1/3 After Action Report Operation Beau Charger
Frag Order #14 to Operation Order 5-67, 17 May 1967

FRAG ORDER NUMBER 14 TO OPERATION ORDER 5-67

Ref:

CTG 79.4 Op Plan 120A-67
CTG 79.4 Frag Order # 1 for Operation "Beau Charger" to Op Plan 120A-67
BLT Op Order 5-67
Operations Overlay (Enclosure (1) to BLT 1/3 Frag Order # 14 to Op Plan 5-67).
Intelligence Estimate for Operation Beau Charger (Enclosure (2) to BLT 1/3 Frag Order #14 to Op Order 5-67).
Maps: Viet Nam AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6443 III and 6442 IV.

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION

BLT 1/3	LTCOL WICKWIRE
H&SCo (-)(Rein)	CAPT MACK
H&SCo (-)
Det. (-) HqBn 3rdMarDiv	CAPT YELLIG
Det. Disbursing Section
Det. Postal Section
Det. 9thMAB (Radio Relay)
Det. HqCo 26thMar (Radio Relay)
Det. Btry A 1stBn 12thMar (LnTm)	LT PHILLIPS
Det. HqBtry 1stBtn 12thMar (NGF LnTm)	ENS MCCORMICK (USN) (KIA handwritten here)
Logistical Support Unit	LT HAUCH
Det. 3rd ServBn
Sec. AirDelPlat H&SCo ProvServBn 9thMAB
1st Clearing Plat(Rein) CoB 3rdMedBn	LT SCH[R?]IBE (USNMC)
Det. 15th Dental Co	LT MCGINN (USNMC)
1st Plat (-) CoB 3rd ReconBn	LT FREEMAN
Co A (Rein)	CAPT JORDON
Co A
Det. HqBtry 1stBn 12thMar (NGF SpotTm)
FO TM Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rdSPBn (HST)
Det. H&SCo
1stSec 81mm Mort Plat
Det. Intel Sec
Det Med Plat
Det. Comm Plat
Det. TACP (FAC Tm)
Sqd 1stPlat Co B 3rd ReconBn
Co B (Rein)	CAPT SHIRLEY
Co B
Det HqBtry 1stBn 12thMar (NGF SpotTm)
FO Tm Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rd SPBn (HST)
Det. H&SCo
2nd Sec 81mm Mort Plat
Det. Intel Sec.
Det. Med Plat
Det.Comm Plat
Det. TACP
Sqd 1stPlat Co B 3rd ReconBn
Co D (Rein)	CAPT ALDOUS
Co D
FO Tm Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rd SPBn (HST)
Det. H&SCo
Sec 106mm [?R] Plat
4th Sec 81mm Mort Plat
Det. Intel Sec
Det. Med Plat
Det. Comm Plat
Det. TACP
Sqd. MP Plat MPCo HqCo 9thMAB
Btry A (-)(Rein) 1stBn 12th Mar	Capt HARRINGTON
Btry A
Det. HqBtry 1stBn 12thMar
107mm Mortar Btry 2ndBn 12th Mar	CAPT PATTERSON
4th Plat(Rein) Co A 5th AmTracBn	LT BROWN
4th Plat Co A 5th AmTracBn
Det. H&SCo 5th AmTracBn
1stPlat (Rein) Co A 3rd ATBn	LT HAYES
1st Plat Co A 3rd ATBn
Det.H&SCo 3rd ATBn
2ndPlat(-)(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn	LT WENTWORTH
2dPlat Co A 3rd Engr Bn
Det. H&SCo 3rd EngrBn
Det Engr SuptCo 3rd EngrBn
1st Plat (Rein) Co B 3rd MtBn	LT BYSTEDT
1st Plat Co B 3rd MTBn
Det. H&SCo 3rd MTBn
2nd Plat(-)(Rein) Co B 3rdSPBn	LT WYMER
2nd Plat Co B 3rdSPBn
Det. H&SCo 3rdSPBn
*Det. BMU, NBG
3rd Plat (Rein) Co C 3rd TankBn	LT DOBBINS
3rd Plat Co C 3rd TankBn
Det. H&SCo 3rd TankBn
BLT RESERVE	CAPT RECZEK
Co C
FO TM Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rdEngrBn
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rdSPBn
Det. H&SCo
3rd Sec 81mm Mort Plat
Det. Intel Sec
Det. Med Plat
Det. Comm Plat
Det. TACP
Det. HqBn 3rdMarDiv (Photo Sec)

* Provided from Navy sources. Becomes a part of the task organization when the Shore Party Team is activated.

SITUATION
1. Enemy Forces.
  1. Current Instsums.
  2. Reference (e).
2. Friendly Forces.
  See reference (b).
3. Attachments and Detachments.
  See Task Organization.
MISSION. Commencing at H and L hour on D-day BLT 1/3 conducts an amphibious assault in Quang Trung Luong Districts, South Vietnam to:
Phase I: Destroy enemy forces and military facilities in the amphibious objective area and evacuate non-combatants from the area.

Phase II: Destroy enemy forces and military facilities south of Phase line Purple to the Cua Viet River.

Phase III: Conduct amphibious withdrawal at the completion of the mission or uponorder.
EXECUTION.
1. Concept of Operations. Commencing at H and L hours one company will conduct a waterborne assault over Green Beach seize and secure the beach area and approaches thereto. Simeultaneously one company will conduct a helicopterborne attack into Landing Zone Goose, seize and secure the landing zone, and commence destruction of enemy forces/military facilities wbas withdrawal of non-combatants from the area. Subsequently a second company will conduct a helicopterborne attack in landing zone Duck and conduct similar operations within their area. One company eill be established as SLF Reserve aboard the LPH to includde SParrow Hawk platoon size force until released to the control of BLT 1/3. On order or upon completion of their mission the BLSwill conduct an amphibious withdrawal.
2. Company "A" (Rein)
  1. Commencing at L-hour, Dday conduct a helicopterborne attack to seize Landing Zone Goose.
  2. Upon seizure of LZ Goose and when sufficient forces are available commence attack on objectives 1 and 2, destroying enemy forces and military facilities enroute and assisting, tactically, in the withdrawal of non-combatants in the area.
  3. On order continue mission from objective 2 along designated axis of advance.
  4. Be prepared to effect linkup with Company B and commence withdrawal in ZOA on order.
3. Company B (Rein)
  1. Commencing on order on D-day, conduct a helicopterborne attack to seise Landing Zone Duck.
  2. Upon seizure of LZ Duck and when sufficient forces are available commence attack of objectives 3e and 4 along designated axis of advance, destroying enemy forces and military forces enroute and assisting, tactically, in the withdrawal of non-combatants in the area.
  3. Be prepared to effect link up with Company A and commence withdrawal in ZOA on order.
4. Company D (Rein)
  1. Commencing at H-hour on D-day conduct a waterborne attack by LVT over Green Beach.
  2. Seize objective 5. Secure beach area and approaches thereto.
  3. Commence patrol/search and destroy operations within assigned ZOA.
  4. Be prepared to detach one platoon reinforced to act as covering force for tank section linkup with Company A.
  5. Be prepared to provide company size reaction force on order.
  6. Establish and maintain security for artillery units ans a limited BSA.
5. Battery "A" (-) (Rein). 1stBn 12thMar.
  1. On order commence waterborne landing in in LVT's over Green Beach.
  2. Establish firing positions vicinity objective 5 and provide direct support fires in support of assault element of BLT 1/3.
  3. /Priority of fires to helicopterborne assault forces.
  4. Be prepared to displace and/or conduct amphibious awithdrawal on order.
6. 107mm Mortar Battery. 2dBn. 12thMar.
  1. On order conduct helicopterborne movement to landing zone vicinity Green Beach. Provide direct support fires in support of assault elements of BLT 1/3.
  2. Priority of fires to helicopterborne assault forces.
  3. Be prepared to displace and/or conduct amphibious withdrawal on order.
7. 4th Platoon. Company A. 5thAmtracBn.
  1. General support.
  2. Provide support for the assault of Company D and A/1/12 over Green Beach.
  3. Be prepared to provide support in the evacuation of non-combatants from the AOA.
  4. Be prepared to provide "A" Cmd Group 2 LVTP-5 Cmd vehicles on order.
  5. Be prepared to support assault elements in the evacuation of wounded personnel.
8. 3d Platoon (Rein) CoC. 3dTankBn.
  1. General support.
  2. On order land over Green Beach. Be prepared to support Co D in securing beach area.
  3. On order provide light tank section to be attached to Co A in their ZOA.
  4. On order provide heavy tank section to be attached to Co B in their ZOA.
9. 1st Platoon (Rein) CoA. 3dATBn.
  1. General support.
  2. On order land over Green Beach. Be prepared to support BLT 1/3 assault elements within AOA.
10. 2d Platoon (-)(Rein) CoA. 3dEngrBn.
  1. General support.
  2. On order land over Green Beach. Be prepared to provide engineer support for assault elements on order.
  3. Ensure elements are organized into heliteams for rapid deployment.
11. 1st Platoon. CoB. 3dReconBn.
  1. General support.
  2. Commencing L-hour, D-day land in designated landing zones with assigned units. On order, conduct surveillance/reconnaissance missions in trace of the assault units withdrawal to the south. Maintain an interval with withdrawing assault companies not to exceed 2,000 meters.
  3. Request and control supporting arms fire missions as required.
12. 1st Platoon (Rein). CoB. 3dMtBn.
  1. General support.
  2. On order land personnel over Green Beach. Provide security personnel within landing beach area.
13. 2ndPlat(-)(Rein) Co B 3rd SPBn.
  1. General support.
  2. On order land over Green Beach. Establish required beach support activity.
14. BLT Reserve
  Co C (Rein)
  1. Provide one platoon (Rein) for Sparrow Hawk Reaction Foroe while aboard LPH in aooordance with Annex [N or H?] of reference ([c?]).
  2. Upon release of Sp Hawk requirements by SLF Commanderm be prepared to be helilifted ashore to function under direct control of BLT 1/3 CO.
  3. On order, land by helicopterborne waves in designated landing zone/objective.
  4. Be prepared to assume the mission of assault companies in assigned ZOA.
15. Coordinating Instructions
  1. RCA authorrized for tactical operations within AOA. Downwind hazard to Friendly troops and non-combatants will be minified consistent with tactical requirements.
  2. D-Day 18 May, H-Hour/L-Hour 0800
  3. Operation code name: Beau Charger
  4. Centered Green Beach Coordinates yd 276780
  5. Direction of withdrawal-- South
  6. All Commanders will be completely familiar with primary and alternate HLZ's
  7. Any fires within 500 meters of battalion boundaries must be cleared by FSCC Dong Hoa.
  8. Co's A and B be prepared for attachment of tank units following the securing of assigned HLZ's.
  9. D Co coordinate link up of tank elements with Co's A and B.
  10. After initial entry into HLZ's ensure HST elements immediately guard LZ Common Neet anf provide adequate guidance for subseequent waves of helicopters
  11. Until arrival of Company Commanders into designated HLZ's subordinate units will guard Bn TAC Net.
  12. All units be prepared to conduct amphibious withdrawal on order.
  13. Fire Support Coordination IAW Annex F to reference (a), and the following:
    1. BLT FSCC is designated SLF Alpha FSCC.
    2. Delete Para 3g and substitute the folloWing: Prearranged on call fires on beach and helicopter landing zones will be submitted to CLF for coordination with SACC and if necessary for submission to supporting agencies reinforcing fires.
    3. In-country FSCC will be located at Dong Ha. SLF LNO will be located at that location. Call sign "Drum Boy 70".
    4. Fires meeting the necessary rules of engagement may be delivered within the AOA. Fires for delivery into or across other unit's ZOA will be submitted to the FSCC at Dong Ha (Parkgreen 22) for clearance.
    5. Fires delivered north of the DMZ will be coordinated with the FSCC at Dong Ha.
    6. Restricted fire areas in accordance with SLF ALpha restrictive fire area overlay.
    7. The Ben Hai bridge at YD 188808 is a restricted target and will not be destroyed exceot with permission of CATF/CLF.
    8. Save-a-plane information will be exchanged with Dong Ha DASC (Landshark Brave). Information on Save-a-plane can be obtained from TACC on HD, TAD, and TAR/TAC nets.
    9. Artillery units operating in close proximity of landing zones will establish communications with the landing zone control element and will notify them of all firing on a timely basis.
    10. A tactical bombline will not be established.
    11. A representative of the Province will initially be located at SACC. Specified strike zones will be published upon receipt.
    12. Conduct of fires north of the PMDL (Provincial Military Demarcation Line) which coincides with the Ben Hai River is permitted when valid military targets exist.
    13. Observed artillery and naval gunfire may be directed against targets of opportunity in the AOA/FBH/OA which are clearly defined as hostile, without obtaining Province chief, District Chief, Sector Commander and Subsector Commander approval.
    14. Appropriate Province chief, District Chief, Sector Commander and Subsector Commander approval is required before directing fire on targets of opportunity not clearly defined ads hostile.
    15. After chop to in-country forces, save-a-plane warning will be submitted to Dong Ha FSCC in the following 5 part format:
      1. Location of firing elements (grid squares)
      2. Location of target (grid squares)
      3. Time commencing fire.
      4. Time end of mission.
      5. Maximum Ordinate.
    16. Save a plane will be utilized for all missions day and night except H&I fires. in case of H&I fires, a restrictive fire plan will be established for night firing except when the maximum ordinate approaches or exceeds 13,000 feet.
  14. NGF in accordance with Annex H and the following:
    1. Task Organization. See CTG 76.4 Frag Order for Beau Charger.
    2. Restrictive targets (See para 13)
    3. Radar Beacon located at Gio Linh.
    4. Pre L/H-hour fires on landing beaches and landing zones will be pre-planned on call. Suppression fires north of the DMZ will be planned for execution to commence prior to H/L-Hour and continue until H/L-Hour plus three.
    5. Communications IAW SLF Alpha COI for Operation Beau Charger.
  15. Artillery IAW Annex I and the following:
    1. Friendly Forces.
    2. A daily report of the number of 105mm and 107mm rounds fired by caliber and type will be submitted by 1/3 FSCC prior to 1400 effective for the 24 hour period ending at 1200.
    3. Requests for reinforcing fires will be submitted to Parkgreen on the Regt FD Net and will be coordinated with Dong Ha FSCC (Parkgreen 22).
  16. Reports IAW Annex J, reference (a)
  17. Centered LZ coordinates
    1. Duck -- yd 228772
    2. Goose -- yd 256794
    3. Owl -- yd 261781
    4. Hawk -- yd 250772
    5. Finch -- yd 235777
  18. Reference Points
    1. Cars 2580 (Cadillac, Ford, etc)
    2. Presidents 2677 (John Adams, Abe Lincoln, etc)
    3. Vegetables 2775 (Corn, potatoes, etc)
    4. Fruits 2973 (Apples, oranges, etc.)
    5. Girls 2871 (Mary, Joan, etc)
    6. Boys 3170 (Bill, Dick, etc.)
    7. Colors 2078 (Red, Blue, etc)
    8. Days 1875 (Monday, Tuesday, etc)
    9. Months 2274 (January, February, etc)
    10. Cities 2171 (New Orleans, Cincinatti, etc)
  19. Air operations IAW Annex G, reference(a).
  20. Rules of Engagement IAW Annex G, reference (a)
  21. The evacuation of non-combatants from the area is the responsibility of a 100 man National Police Force embarked in a platoon of LVT's. The BLT Commander will limit his actions in evacuating non-combatants to assistance. The BLT Commander, as the tactical commander on the scene, may regulate the flow of LVT's and restrict their activity in insecure areas. Once non-combatants have been lifted from the BLT ZOA responsibility for further passage to Dong hae will be assumed by SLF Alpha. All non-combatants will be removed from the specified area regardless of their personal desires.
  22. The 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion is conducting continuing patrolling in the Phase II area at this time. These patrols will be coordinated with BLT actions as Phase II operations begin. Appropriate liaison will be arranged by SLF Alpha.
  23. Amphibious withdrawal code name -- Snow Ball.
ADMINISTARTION AND LOGISTICS
1. Admin and logistics instructions continued in Administrative Order 5-67 apply except as modified below.
  1. Supplies
    1. Commencing D+1 supplies will become available for all classes of supply from Force Log Spt Unit (FLSU) at Dong Ha.
    2. Tac-Log Groups will be established aboard Okinawa, Pt Defiance, Bayfield and Whitfield City.
    3. Resupply
      1. From FISU at Dong Ha commencing D+1. First requests to be made evening D-day to BLT S-4 via HST net.
      2. All resupply to be delivered by LCU to BSA established by BLT. Unit distribution by LVTP or SLF direct support Helos as appropriate.
      3. Shore Party Net will be established at FLSU Dong Ha prior to D-day. Guard BLT Tac-Log Net.
      4. Resupply requests from BLT will go to FLSU Dong Ha over Tac-Log Net.
      5. Emergency resupply and water from LPH by helo.
      6. Resupply of all classes will be requested through BLT S-4 and relayed to Dong Ha or Okinawa as appropriate.
      7. LVTP fuel available from 1stAmTracBn fuel dispensing system at mouth of CUA Viet River.
    4. Tac-Log report daily by 2000H as of 1800H Qty of supplies issued BLT froom ships. For ammunition issues report Qty by ship, DODAC and Nomen.
  2. Evacuation and Hospitalization.
  3. Service
    1. Assets, clothing block and LSU repair parts block commencing D+1 will be issued only when combat essential.
    2. Class II supplies not available Dong Ha.
    3. There is limited maintenance contact team assistance and spare parts available from FLSU Dong Ha.
    4. LPH provides 451 Btry charging service.
  4. Miscellaneous
    1. No distribution of handclasp material anticipated.
    2. Uniform and Equipment.
      1. LMP w/E-tool; poncho, 1pr socks and light toilet articles; 3 meals w/heat.
      2. Complete cartridge belt.
      3. Helmet and flak jacket.
COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS
1. Comm-Elec
  1. Annex I to Reference C
  2. Current COI.
2. Command Posts
  1. The SLF Command Post will be located aboard the USS Okinawa (LPH-3).
  2. BLT 1/3 CP ashore-- to be announced.
  3. Company and Battery commanders report CP locations when established.

P.A. Wickwire signature
P. A. WICKWIRE
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. MARINE CORPS
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex S to Ref (c)

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 3d Marines
FPO San Francisco 96602

6/dah
5050
SerNo: 009-67
31 May 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander task Group 79.4

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation Beau Charger)

Encl: (1) Map Sheet 6442 IV

1. Name of Operation. Beau Charger, Search and Destroy Operation.

2. Inclusive Dates and Location of Operation. 18 May - 26 May 1967. Quang Tri Province RVN.

3. Command Headquarters. CTG 79.4

4. Task Organization

BLT 1/3	LTCOL WICKWIRE
H&SCo (-)(ReinF)	CAPT MACK
H&SCo (-)
Det. (-) HqBn 3rdMarDiv	CAPT YELLIG
Det. Disbursing Section
Det. Postal Section
Det. 9thMAB (Radio Relay)
Det. HqCo 26thMar (Radio Relay)
Det. Btry A 1stBn 12thMar (LnTm)	LT PHILLIPS
Det. HqBtry 1stBtn 12thMar (NGFLnTm)	ENS MCCORMICK (USN)
Logistical Support Unit	LT HAUCH
Det. 3rd ServBn
Sec. AirDelPlat H&SCo ProvServBn 9thMAB
1st Clearing Plat(Rein) CoB 3rdMedBn	LT SCHEIBE (USNMC)
Det. 15th Dental Co	LT MCGINN (USNMC)
1st Plat (-) CoB 3rd ReconBn	LT FREEMAN
Co A (Rein)	CAPT JORDON
Co A
Det. HqBtry 1stBn 12thMar (NGF SpotTm)
FO TM Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rdSPBn (HST)
Det. H&SCo
1stSec 81mm Mort Plat
Det. Intel Sec
Det Med Plat
Det. Comm Plat
Det. TACP (FAC Tm)
Sqd 1stPlat Co B 3rd ReconBn
Co B (Rein)	CAPT SHIRLEY
Co B
Det HqBtry 1stBn 12thMar (NGF SpotTm)
FO Tm Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rd SPBn (HST)
Det. H&SCo
2nd Sec 81mm Mort Plat
Det. Intel Sec.
Det. Med Plat
Det.Comm Plat
Det. TACP
Sqd 1stPlat Co B 3rd ReconBn
Co C (Rein)	CAPT RECZEK
Co C
FO TM Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rdEngrBn
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rdSPBn
Det. H&SCo
3rd Sec 81mm Mort Plat
Det. Intel Sec
Det. Med Plat
Det. Comm Plat
Det. TACP
Det. HqBn 3rdMarDiv (Photo Sec)
Co D (Rein)	CAPT ALDOUS
Co D
FO Tm Btry A 1stBn 12thMar
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn
Det. 2ndPlat(Rein) Co B 3rd SPBn (HST)
Det. H&SCo
Sec 106mm [?R] Plat
4th Sec 81mm Mort Plat
Det. Intel Sec
Det. Med Plat
Det. Comm Plat
Det. TACP
Sqd. MP Plat MPCo HqCo 9thMAB
Btry A (-)(Rein) 1stBn 12th Mar	Capt HARRINGTON
Btry A
Det. HqBtry 1stBn 12thMar
107mm Mortar Btry 2ndBn 12th Mar	CAPT PATTERSON
4th Plat(Rein) Co A 5th AmTracBn	LT BROWN
4th Plat Co A 5th AmTracBn
Det. H&SCo 5th AmTracBn
1stPlat (Rein) Co A 3rd ATBn	LT HAYES
1st Plat Co A 3rd ATBn
Det.H&SCo 3rd ATBn
2ndPlat(-)(Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn	LT WENTWORTH
2dPlat Co A 3rd Engr Bn
Det. H&SCo 3rd EngrBn
Det Engr SuptCo 3rd EngrBn
1st Plat (Rein) Co B 3rd MtBn	LT BYSTEDT
1st Plat Co B 3rd MTBn
Det. H&SCo 3rd MTBn
2nd Plat(-)(Rein) Co B 3rdSPBn	LT WYMER
2nd Plat Co B 3rdSPBn
Det. H&SCo 3rdSPBn
*Det. BMU, NBG
3rd Plat (Rein) Co C 3rd TankBn	LT DOBBINS (KIA handwritten here)
3rd Plat Co C 3rd TankBn
Det. H&SCo 3rd TankBn

5. Intelligence. The enemy situation and disposition in the TAOR revealed the presence of one unidentified NVA Battalion and the K400 LF COmpany, with an estimated overall strength of 620.

Enemy contact in the vicinity LZ Goose consisted of an estimated company disposed in an extensive trench system with automatic weapons. Infantry assault and use of supporting arms counted for heavy toll NBA casualties with the remainder exfiltrating and taking the dead and woonded with them.
Contact in the vicinity of Objectives 1,2,3, and 5 was believed to be NVA units maintaining blocking positions while main elements of an NVA company exfiltrated North of the Ben Hai River.
After reaching the Ben Hai River and the sweeping action to the South was initiated, weapons and equipment were discovered. Vietnamese people were offered the opportunity of safe passage to the refugee collection point at Green Beach YD275780 and White Beach.
Enemy contact in the vicinity of Green Beach YD275780 was negative, however, a VCS aprehended on 19 May at coord YD273770 immediately after an intense accurate artillery barrage on the Bravo Command CP, possessed money, a 3in mirror and some Vietnamese papers (not able to be translated at CP). VCS appeared to be young 20-24, healthy and his posessions at time of capture made him a prime suspect of being a forward observer for the artillery barrage received shortly before his capture. Results of interrogation by ITT personnel are unknown at this time.
Enemy losses for this operation were:
85 KIA Confirmed
84 KIA Probable
6 VCS/POW (1 POW Died of wounds)
VC/NVA weapons captured were:
18 SKS/AK 47 assault rifles 7.62mm
5 140mm rocket launchers
2 B-40/RPG 2 A.T. launchers
VC/NVA items of equipment captured were:
13 packs
2 medical bags
2 wallets w/NVA identification
5 documents (not translated)
3 Signaling drums
2 rounds of B-40/RPG 2 ammunition
2 CHICOM field phones
14 sticks of explosive material (destroyed by engineers)
31 blasting caps (destroyed by engineers)
5 CHICOM Grenedes (destroyed by engineers)
620 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition (destroyed by engineers)
The temperature during the operation was well over 100 degrees. Early morning hours the wind was from the West with an estimated velocity of 15-20 knots and by dawn it would cease.

6. Mission

Phase I. Commencing at H-hour on D-day, land by waterborne assault on Green Beach, seize and secure the beach in approaches thereto; uncover positions and establish and maintain security for artillery units and a limited Beach Support area to be landed. Commencing at L-hour on D-day land by heliborne assault into LZ's Goose and Duck, seize and secure the landing zones. Commence withdrawal of noncombatants from the area and destruction of enemy forces and military facilities from the Ben Hai River in the North, southwward to phase line purple. Establish a reserve rifle company aboard LPH prepared to land by heliborne means, and commit it only with permission of CLF.Establish a rifle platoon sized Sparrow Hawk force aboard the LPH.
Phase II. Be prepared to conduct search and clear missions south of phase line purple, to the Cua Viet river on order.
Phase III. On order, conduct an amphibious withdrawal.

7. Execution

H-hour was designated as 180800 May 1967, with one company, reinforced by tanks and ontos, landing in LVT;s over Green Beach. L-hour was designated as 180800 May 1967, with one company landing in LZ Goose, followed by one company landing in LZ Duck. Withdrawal of noncombatants from the DMZ and destruction of all enemy forces and facilities within the DMZ were conducted, followed by search and clear operations in the area south of the DMZ to the Cua Viet River.
Chronological sequence of events from 180800 through 261010 May 1967:

180800: Assault elements of Co A landed in LZ Goose (coord 256794) under heavy fire.
180802: 1st wave of LVT's carrying Co D landed on Green Beach (coord 276780) followed by the 2d wave at 0803 and one light secction of tanks at 0813. Negative enemy contact encountered.
180855: Subsequent waves of Co A diverted and landed in LZ Owl not under enemy fire.
180920: One platoon of Co D and a light section of tanks joined Co A in LZ Owl.
180930: First wave of Co B into LZ Owl instead of LZ Duck (coord 228772) as originally planned.
180950: Command Group arrived in LZ Owl.
181010: Air strike oalled on coord 250807. Ten buildings destroyed.
181056: Air strike called on coord. 250807. Seven buildings destroyed, five damaged.
181100: Company A and tanks linked up with elements of Co A in LZ Goose.
181230: Co A reports four enemy KIA (confirmed and five KIA probable).
181255: Alpha and Bravo Command Group ashore at Green Beach.
181345: Companies A and B involved in heavy fighting with three reinforced rifle companies near LZ Goose.
181430: Company C landed in LZ Owl.
181432: Company B reported ten enemy KIA (confirmed).
181510: Company B reported four enemy KIA (confirmed) and ten KIA (probable).
181700: Company A reported forty enemy KIA (confirmed) and seven KIA (probable) during day's fighting.
181732: Company A reported one enemey KIA (confirmed).
181830: Company C reported one enemy KIA (confirmed), and one enemy POW (wounded).
181900: Evacuated a total of forty-three noncombatants from the DMZ.
181930: During day, units received 3 rds 823mm, 2rds 105mm and 6 rds 60mm incoming. No friendly casualties.
190630: Company A reported three enemy KIA (confirmed) and fifteen KIA (probable) at objective #1. Objective #1 (coord, 252800) secured.
190916: Air strikes from 10640 to 0812 at coord. 241793, 245787, and 250808 resulted in twelve enemy KIA (confirmed), and thirty-three KIA (probable).
190958: Co B captured two 140mm rocket launchers.
191045: Company B secured objective #6 at coord.239791.
191120: Company B captured one 140mm rocket launcher.
191130: Company A Secured objective #2 at coord. 251807.
191310: Green Beach received approximately sixty rounds of incoming 85mm fire from North Viet Nam.
191630: Green received forty rounds of 85mm fire from North Viet Nam,
191720: Green Beach rceived 32 rounds of 85mm fire from North Vietnam. Friendly casualties for period 3 KIA 8 WIA.
191900: A Co., B Co., and C Co. received approximately twenty rounds of 82mm, sixty-eight rounds 60mm and forty rounds 85mm during the day. Four friendly WIA sustained.
192330: VC digging in near Green Beach were fired upon by Ontos resulting in six enemy KIA (probable).
192400: Evacuated a total of 274 noncombatants from the Demilitarized Zone.
200435: Company B listening post made contact with ten VC near coord. 250788 resulting in four enemy KIA (confirmed) and 2 enemy KIA (probable). Captured one 140mm Rocket Tube, and four AK-47's.
200700: Total friendly casualties for actions on 18 and 19 May are: 22 KIA, 46 WIAE, 9 WIANE. Total enemy casualties are: 80 KIA (confirmed), 52 KIA (probable) and 3 POW's.
200740: Received seventy-five replacements at Green Beach.
200810: Copany C secured objective #3 at coord. 233784.
200910: Green Beach received approximately 30 rounds of 85mm incoming from North Viet Nam. Friendly casualties 1 KIA 2 WIA.
201610: Company A received six incoming rounds of 60mm mortar rounds.
201710: Bravo Command Group and Co D commenced movement from Green Beach to White Beach, coord. 320720.
202230: Bravo Command Group and Company D in new position at White Beach.
202400: Evacuated a total of 135 noncombatants from Demilitarized Zone.
211555: Company A ambush opened fire on teo VC at 26877[7?]. One enemy KIA (probable).
212045: Company C killed one VC with rifle at coord. 243761. One enemy KIA (confirmed).
212340: White beach received approximately 25 rounds of incoming 85mm fire. Rounds hit 300 meters north of friendly lines.
212400: During this period, units conducted search and clear operations north of Phase line Blue. Eighty-four noncombatants were evacuated from the Demilitarized Zone.
22 May 67: Units continued search and clear operations between Phase Line Blue and Purple.
23 May 67: Units observed twenty-four Hour Truce in honor of Buddha's birthday. No incidents reported.At 1600, one tank hit an explosive device and was badly damaged.
24 May 67: Units moved south of Phase Line Purple for search and clear operations south to Phase Line Red. At 1232, incoming fire was received about 800 meters north of White Beach positions at coord 305728. Two Amtracs traversing that area received incoming rounds within 200 meters.
25 May 67: At 1445 White Beach received ten rounds of incoming 85mm fire and one 120mm Mortar round. All fire was north and to the flanks of friendly positions. The 120mm mortar round was [WP?] and hit 20-30 meters from the basegun of A/1/12. Units conducted search and clear operations north of Phase Line Black, and prepared for Phase III of Operation Beau Charger, the amphibious withdrawal. At 2000, Co B ontos and A/1/12 withdrew from AOA.
26 May 67: At 0200, Co A withdrew from the AOA followed by Co, Bravo Command Group and W/2/12 at 0630, shore party at 0730, Alpha Command Group at 0800, and Tanks at 0930. Co D covered the withdrawal, and was itself extracted from the AOA at 1010. No incidents or enemy contact occurred during the withdrawal.

8. Results

Enemy losses for this operation were:
85 KIA Confirmed
84 KIA Probable
6VCS/POW (1 POW Died of wounds)
VC/NVA weapons captured were:
18 SKS/AK 47 assault rifles 7.62mm
5 140mm rocket launchers
2 B-40/RPG 2 A.T. launchers
VC/NVA items of equipment captured or destroyed:
13 packs
2 medical bags
2 wallets w/NVA identification
5 documents (not translated)
3 Signaling drums
2 rounds of B-40/RPG 2 ammunition
2 CHICOM field phones
14 sticks of explosive material (destroyed by engineers)
31 blasting caps (destroyed by engineers)
5 CHICOM Grenedes (destroyed by engineers)
620 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition (destroyed by engineers)
Friendly Casualties:
23 KIA
73 WIA
26 WIANE
Friendly equipment lost or destroyed:
9 M16 rifles
2 [?]5 cal pistols
1 M-79
1 107 Howtar
1 LVT [...]
3 M-14 rifles
1 aiming circle for 107 How.
2 H-35 Headsets
2 AB591
1 M-60 MG-destroyed, barrel group completely demolished
1 TA-125
1 M48A1 tank-hit enemy mine; not totally destroyed, extent of damage is not determined at this time.

9. Commander's Analysis.

The most costly problem encountered was the landing of the first wave of helicopters out of the designated LZ in too-close proximity to enemy troops in prepared positions. The combination of no prep fires in the zone, no reconnaissance of the area prior to landing, difficulty in relating the maps and photos to the ground all contributed to the problem.

Some difficulty was experienced in coordinating movement of units with the adjacentorganization, however, no major problems arose due to this.

The selection of LZ's Duck and Goose in widely separated areas could have created a difficult tactical problem had not LZ Duck been eliminated after H-hour. Mutual support during the assault is a necessity except where risks can be minimized.

The LVT was indispensable in the DMZ environment which was extremely hostile to helicopters initially.

Goo discipline, dispersion, and preparation of individual protective holes and shelters at every halt minimized casualties from indirect fire weapons.

Civic Action/PsyWar activities took the form of USMC assistance and support of National Police in the evacuation of civilians. No significant problems were encountered. An attempt to remove civilians by USMC personell would have been awkward, however, a number of refugees voluntarily followed Marine units out of the DMZ when NP's were nor present. One company commander remarked that civilians would exit the area willingly as long as Mrines were present.

Planning for the ecacuation of civilians was based on the use of NP's to follow the clearing operation and to direct civilians toward Green/White Beach. LVT's were to be employed to assist in this lift. Civilians were to be taken by craft to Dong Ha after collection at the beach.

10. Lessons Learned.

Topic: Selection of Landing Zones for the amphibious helicopter assault.

Discussion:

The requirement to carefully select mutually supporting landing zones was vividly demonstrated during Operation Beau Charger. Pre-D-Day and L-Hour information in the form of aerial photographs and complete use of the intelligence process is an absolute requirement. The utilization of these procedures still does not reduce the requirement to locate primary landing zones where units in either zone can lend rapid assistance to each other in the form of supporting fires (i.e. 81mm & 60mm Mortar) or actual physical link up.

Suggested maximum separation between primary zones should not exceed 1500 meters. This system lends itself to the relatively smooth introduction of a third unit (not necessarily an assault element), flexible enough to provide assistance to either unit needing support.
Topic: Use of helicopter and AmTrac in a "hot" enemy mortar and artillery environment.

Discussion:

During the conduct of Operation Beau Charger, the friendly situation was constantly threatened by a large volume of incoming mortar and artillery fire. The enemy used every opportunity to "fix" friendly positions and deliver fire. This fact completely negated the use of helicopter for med-evac and resupply support of "forward" elements. Counter mortar and artillery fires provided by friendly artillery , mortars and naval gunfire were continually employed, but did not prevent the enemy rapid, effective short duration fires into friendly positions which were attempting to med-evac or receive needed resupplies. It was at this point the LVT P-5 proved its value to the BLT. FOrtunaatelythe terrain favored utilization of the AmTrac and as a result all medevacuations and resupply of forward companies were handled by the LVT's. The enemy did not appear to have the observation required or the flexibility to bring effective fires to bear on those elements. Of course the tactical scheme was constantly threatened by the maintenance problems of the tracked vehicle or by the noise problem (especially at night) but detailed prior planning produced the flexibility to overcome these handicaps.
Topic: Movement of the Battalion's units to avoid enemy indirect fire.

Discussion:

As was previously stated the enemy possessed a strong capability to bring heavy indirect fire to bear on friendly units os f the battalion at any time. The fact that the second half of the operation was characterized by a sharp decline in enemy incoming can be attributed to two thingsL (1) A broad and accurate program by frienddly air/artillery and Naval Gunfire which supressed and destroyed many enemy gun positions. (2) A rigorous system of movement by the battalion designed to prevent the enemy from "fixing" the battalion's location. The system was demanding and successful. The following principles were adhered to:
1. Displace units at various times throughout the hours of daylight and darkness.
2. "Stand to" and be "dug in " one hour before dark, wherever the battalion elements may be located.
3. Make maximum use of whatever cover and concealment the area afforded.
4. Avoid resupply and med-evacuation by helicopter if at all possible. (The use of the LVT, despite the noise factor was invaluable.)
5. Change the basic direction of movement of battalion or company frequently even to the point of doubling back when possible.
6. Avoid occupying a position throughout the night after having been used the previous day.
Topic: The enemy's use of the hugging tactic.

Discussion:

It would appear again that the enemy, fully aware of our supporting arm strength, chooses to counteract this advantage by fighting his battles as close to friendly front lines as possible. This places a greater demand for accuracy on friendly air, artillery, Mortar, Naval Gunfire. One added twist to this basic premise appears to be the use of his mortars on friendly positions from extremely short distances, not in excess of 600 meters. Counter mortar plans should reflect this tendency whenever possible.
Topic: Resupply

Discussion:

Extensive employment of LVT's was effected for collection and evacuation of KIA and WIA personnel and equipment, as well as resupply, during Operation Beau Charger/Hickory. LVT utilization provided for ease of support of using units of BLT 1/3 from the BSA and contributed significantly to the success of the operation. It was found that local resupply during the hours of 1000-1400 was most effective and least disruptive of operations.

Discussion:

Support and resupply of class I, III and V items from the LSA Dong Ha was outstanding throughout the operation. Many class II items in clothing and equipment parts were requested but not in stock at the LSA Dong Ha. Solution to procurement of class II items would be to send an SLF supply representative to DaNang on a regular basis to obtain needed priority items. The SLF replacement clothing block, for example, contains regular boots insted of jungle boots.

Discussion:

Use of the BSA for salvage of all items of equipment was considered indispensable.

P.A. Wickwire signature
P. A. WICKWIRE